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Scope and Effectiveness of No-Contest
Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments
By JACK LEAVITT*
LAST wills and testaments may have derived from a native curse,
the dying maledictions of tribal elders who threatened posthumous
revenge if their heirs disposed of property contrary to the decedents'
wishes.' A still-dynamic parallel to this primitive coercion is the no-
contest clause found in many (perhaps most) current wills. What
these clauses generally provide is that a beneficiary under the will
must take exactly as the testator provided or not at all. Directed against
beneficiaries who are also heirs, the forfeiture penalties are used to
induce disappointed survivors to take a lesser benefit under the will
rather than risk an all or nothing gamble by contesting probate and
straining to reach the decedent's estate as his heirs.2 Two examples of
such clauses will illustrate their purpose and design:
I declare that except as otherwise provided in this Will, I have
intentionally omitted to provide herein for any of my heirs, including
my children and the issue of any deceased child. If any beneficiary
under this Will shall in any manner contest or attack this Will or any
of its provisions, then in such event any share or interest in my estate
given to such contesting beneficiary under this Will is hereby revoked
and shall be disposed of in the same manner provided herein as if such
contesting beneficiary had predeceased me.3
Except as expressly provided in this will, I have intentionally
made no provision for any other person, whether claiming to be an
heir of mine or not, and if any person shall be successful in a court of
final jurisdiction in establishing a right to any portion of my estate,
* B.A., 1951, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1958, University of Illinois; LL.M.,
1963, University of California (Berkeley). Member of the Faculty, San Francisco Law
School. Admitted to practice in California and Illinois.
1 See IV SUMANER, KELLER, DAVIE, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY 624-25 (1928).
' See JOHNSON, A DtArTSAIAN's HANDBOOK FoR WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS 575-76
(1961). Johnson considers a provision of this type as having "limited usefulness." But cf.
Estate of Miller 212 A.C.A. 279, 287, 27 Cal. Rptr. 909, 914, (1963), where the court observed
that "Everyone seems to be in terror of the in terrorem clause," even though no one had
formally raised the question of forfeiture.
'BANK or AMERICA, SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR WILLS AND TRUSTS 21 (3d ed. 1960).
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except as expressly provided in this will, I give to such person the sum
of $5.00 and no more. If any beneficiary under this will shall directly
or indirectly contest this will (which shall include any codicil hereto)
or object to or oppose the probate thereof, or take any proceedings
before any court to annul any provision thereof, or have any provision
thereof declared void, or to have the probate revoked, or should any
person, if requested to do so by my executor, decline to join in the
application for the probate of this will or decline to assent to the
probate thereof, then and in any such event I direct that all interest
of such person in or under this will as a legatee or devisee shall cease
and become void, and the sum or property or benefit such person
would have received under said will shall be added to the residue of
my estate and shall be distributed to the beneficiaries of such residue
as herein provided in the same shares and in the same manner as if
such person so offending against the provisions of this paragraph had
died at that time without heirs.4
The particular language used to achieve compliance with the testa-
tor's wishes naturally varies from will to will, according to the style
of the individual draftsman. For the most part, these semantic varia-
tions have been treated as negligible in this article, on the generally
valid observation that whenever the clauses were similar in substance
they led to the same legal consequences within the same jurisdiction.
At this point, however, we must emphasize an important caveat. The
no-contest clause, if defied, can lead to forfeiture of a beneficiary's
entire interest under the will. Since forfeitures are disfavored by the
courts, the no-contest clause is strictly construed to prevent this result
whenever possible. Only if the acts of the party come strictly within
the express terms of the punitive clause is the breach declared.' As
one result, for example, the testatrix's use of language prohibiting her
beneficiaries from "instituting" legal proceedings was held not to work
a forfeiture because the challenged beneficiary did not join the other
contestants until about one year after the contest was "instituted." 6
Precise language being so crucial at such times, the attorney with a
specific will in hand should pay more heed at first to a comparison
between the actual wording of his document and that of previously-
disputed wills than to an assessment of legal principles based on an
assumed ideal no-contest clause. In the beginning, as has been elsewhere
related, was the Word.
' WELLS FARGO BANK, SUGGESTED FoRMs oF WiLLs & TRUSTS 5-6 (ca. 1962).
5In re Crisler's Estate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 198, 217 P.2d 470 (1950).
6 Lobb v. Brown, 208 CaL 476, 281 Pae. 1010 (1929).
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The legal treatment of these clauses varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, with such incompatible results that in Indiana a no-contest
clause threatening forfeiture is statutorily void,' while in New Jersey
the courts will enforce a forfeiture of virtually all gifts made under a
will when the document is contested by someone who is not even a
beneficiary.' What makes these differences important is the regular
tendency of courts to cite decisions in other jurisdictions on nice points
arising from no-contest litigation. Even though an attorney, as in
California, is faced with the fiat proposition that a no-contest clause
is valid and enforceable,9 he may properly and wisely cite foreign
precedents to urge that a situation unique in California should (or
should not) create an exception to the general rule. Few jurisdictions,
if any, have settled law that encompasses all varieties of family disputes
over the claimed affection of the dead for the living.
This article will therefore range over the whole spectrum of no-
contest litigation, beginning with its historical setting, continuing
through discussions of basic validity or invalidity of the disputed
clause, of the effect of good faith and probable cause to contest, of
the sufficiency of "hostile" acts to work a forfeiture, and of the effect
of a contestant's minority, and concluding with some criticisms of
California law, especially as to the view that a testator can dispose of
property without consulting the wishes of others. 0
The Historical Setting
The earliest English decisions that cope with forfeiture problems
deriving from a beneficiary's post-testamentary conduct are brief,
curtly announcing answers to problems that still vex our courts. Liti-
gation in 167411 turned on the effect of a clause directed against A,
the testator's heir at law, to protect B, a devisee, as follows:
"If A. molest B. by suit or otherwise, he shall lose what is devised to
him, and it shall go to B."
After the testator's death, A entered into and claimed B's lands.
The court held that the testamentary language created an estate on
7 INDIANA ACTS (1953) ch. 112 § 602, p. 295; 3 BURNs STAT. § 6-602 (1953).
'Alper v. Alper, 2 N.J. 105, 65 A.2d 737 (1949).
"Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pae. 443 (1909).
10 See In re Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 300 P.2d 342 (1956).
11Aonymous, 2 Mod. 7, 86 Eng. Rep. 910 (1674).
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limitation and that A's actions were a sufficient molestation to breach
the forfeiture clause and entitle B to the land originally devised to A.
But when, in 1688, a beneficiary contested a will's validity despite a
condition that he not disturb or interrupt the will, a court set forth as
its entire decision: "There was probabilis causa litigandi, and it was
not a forfeiture of the legacy.'
12
Some years later, again without elaboration, a court ruled that
if a son were given forty pounds on condition that he not disturb the
trustees and if the trustees were about to have an execution of the
trust, the son may have the legacy if he joins with the trustees in the
sale. If not, he forfeits the legacy.'" That trustees received no blanket
protection for their actions was soon made evident when a trustee was
scathingly denied any help from a clause declaring the testator's
beneficiaries should forfeit their annuities under the will if they
disputed the instrument.' 4 The trustee in question had refused to pay
certain annuities to the beneficiaries despite the testator's plain intent
in making those gifts. Not only was the trustee required to pay the
annuities in full, but the Lord Chancellor so "very much disliked" his
conduct that he was ordered to pay costs himself for making "so ill a
defense, as not to have deserved the least favor by this decree."' 5
The relationship between a gift under a will and a child's right to
his orphanage part-the share once reserved to surviving children by
the custom of London-soon bred legal conflicts which partially
depended on whether the forfeiture clause was merely in terrorem
and therefore inoperative. When a testator's will gave a thirty-five
pound legacy to his daughter on the express condition that neither she
nor her husband should make a claim or disturb the executors on pre-
tense of the custom of London, her bill in equity, insisting on the custom
and seeking the minimum advancement due to children, was dismissed.
She had, it seems, received the requisite amount through a marriage
advancement forty years earlier. Regardless of the daughter's insistence
that the condition was in terrorem only, the legacy had been given over
and vested in a third person on breach of the condition. Therefore,
"equity cannot fetch it back again."' 6 Children of another testator,
" Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90, 23 Eng. Rep. 668 (1688). The court, of course, might
have been more elaborate than its reporter in arriving at this decision.
Webb v. Webb, 1 P.W. 132, 24 Eng. Rep. 325 (1710).
"Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P.W. 344, 24 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1734).
"Id. at 345, 24 Eng. Rep. at 1095.
10 Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P.W. 526, 24 Eng. Rep. 846, 847 (1729).
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however, were successful in obtaining distribution of orphanage shares
even though the will provided that if a child tried to divide the estate
according to the custom of London his legacy should be void and sink
into the residue of the estate.1 The threatening clause was held to be
in terrorern only, since no forfeiture could be incurred by contesting
any disputable matter in a court of justice. Yet the forfeiture clause
was given practical effect for the children taking orphanage were made
to renounce their legacies because they could not claim under both the
custom and the will. The court also noted that a forfeiture would
result when there is a gift over on breach of the condition, but appar-
ently did not regard the residuary gift as sufficient to meet this test.
On this note, though somewhat out of chronological order, we
should consider two matters raised in the orphanage cases:
What is the effect of a beneficiary's being able to benefit from the
will and also from an outside source that is in conflict with the testa-
mentary provisions?
What forces come into play when the issues of "in terrorein" and
"gift over" are raised?
Benefits Inconsistent With the Will
An equitable analogy to express provisions against contesting or
disturbing a will has taken root in situations where a beneficiary has
access to the testator's estate both through the will and through an
outside source like the laws of intestate succession. Perhaps the clearest
illustration of the problem was drawn in a mid-eighteenth century
decision where the testator's granddaughter, his sole heir at law, faced
a will that gave her a legacy of twelve hundred pounds but left real
estate to another person.'" Under the statutory provisions regulating
the execution of wills, the instrument was in proper form to pass the
legacy as personal property to her, but because of technical defects
could not properly pass the real estate to the designated beneficiary.
To the inquiry of whether she could claim the legacy under the valid
part of the will and the real estate as an heir at law who can avoid
the ineffective clause, the Lord Chancellor said, "No." She could either
take the legacy under the will and waive her rights to claim the real
estate by descent, or could demand the land as heir and forfeit the
legacy. As later stated by a Massachusetts court:
"? Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 399, 26 Eng. Rep. 253 (1737).
18 Boughton v. Boughton, 2 Ves. Sen. 12, 28 Eng. Rep. 8 (1750).
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It is now a well settled rule in equity, that if any person shall take
any beneficial interest under a will, he shall be held thereby to confirm
and ratify every other part of the will, or in other words, a man shall
not take any beneficial interest under a. will, and at the same time
set up any right or claim of his own, even if otherwise legal and well
founded, which shall defeat, or in any way prevent the full effect and
operation of every part of the will.-"
This rule, apparently so fair and based on such reasonable grounds,
illustrates how difficult it is to find a principle that cannot rapidly be
corrupted. On the general theory that no person can be permitted to
take any benefit under a will without giving effect to all its provisions,
a South Carolina court realized that no one was in a position to complain
about illegal gifts made in a will that had become the subject of
litigation.2" A statute which limited gifts to the testator's mistress and
illegitimate children was plainly evaded because the gifts -designated
for those persons exceeded twenty-five percent of the decedent's estate.
But the complaining party, who was a stranger, could not contest the
will since he had no interest in it and would take nothing if it were
declared void; the next of kin could not complain about the size of
the gifts because, assuming they were successful, it would be the
residuary beneficiaries and not the heirs who would profit; and the
residuary beneficiaries could not attempt to have- the gifts voided
since "by the very act of suing they would forfeit all benefit under
the will."'" The court, though plainly troubled by its conclusion, pre-
ferred to countenance an illegal act rather than upset what it, considered
to be good law. Perhaps we can recognize additional difficulties with
maintaining a consistent legal philosophy when we reflect that the same
South Carolina court, fifteen years later, used commendable logic in
allowing a testator's beneficiary to attack and destroy a testamentary
provision which conflicted with a statute.22 Explaining itself, the court
19 Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303, 308 (Mass. 1835). For a more complete analysis of this
rule, we must include an important exception that was soon established in Massachusetts.
Hapgood v. Houghton, 22 Pick. 480 (Mass. 1839), determined that the gift of one benefit
under a will does not exclude the beneficiary from another benefit contrary to the will if the
testamentary gift was not meant to be in lieu of all other claims. Accord: Morrison v.
Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 (1865). See text at notes 155-63 infra.
2 0 Breithaupt v. Bauskett, 1 Rich. Eq. 465 (S.C. 1838).
21 Ibid. Independently of this equitable rationale, the court could have used an express
no-contest provision in the will but apparently chose to rely instead on these equitable
principles.
22 Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12 (S.C. 1853).
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observed that the beneficiary did not claim against the valid part of the
will but only against the void part, which is considered as struck out
of the instrument. Such reasoning should gratify our sense of legal
propriety in refusing to underwrite unlawful testamentary schemes
unless we have qualms about the fact that the provision being voided
had been designed to emancipate the testator's slaves.
All in all, the establishment of the principle against permitting
the same person to benefit from the will and then avoid it by an incon-
sistent claim helped pave the way for the generally favorable reception
accorded to no-contest clauses.
The "In Terrorem" and "Gift Over" Concepts
In tracing the development of the in terrorem concept, we encounter
some obsolete jurisdictional matters and incidentally see why modern
judges commonly misuse legal terms when they refer to all forfeiture
clauses as being in terrorem.
Through "a peculiar constitution of this island,"2 English ecclesi-
ustical courts once had great power over testamentary causes and
exercised concurrent jurisdiction with equity courts over the distribu-
tion of legacies. But the temporal courts refused to allow the clergy
to control the devolution of real property, assuming the position that
since the Church had taken the chattels, it should pay the debts on the
land. 4 As a result, conditional devises of land simply followed the
common law rules while conditional legacies, for the sake of uniformity
among all courts, were made to conform to canon law procedure. 5
Then chancery, which had obligingly treated conditions subsequent
in restraint of marriage as void, eventually modified its position. The
conditions were just ignored as empty threats, merely in terrorern
verbiage that was never intended to change the direction of testamentary
gifts but was meant as the decedent's final request. To this doctrine,
however, there was a major exception. Whenever a testator directed
that, on a designated beneficiary's breach or non-performance of a
condition, the legacy should be given over to another beneficiary, the
condition became available and was obligatory on the courts. Threats
-13 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 95. See also 1 WOERNER, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
ADMINISTRATION 337-43 (2d ed. 1899); REPPY & TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS 96-159 (1928).
"1 REPPY & TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE 'LAW OF WILLS
135 (1928).
2 See Scott v. Tyler, 2 Dick. 712, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
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of forfeiture coupled with a gift over were not more favored than
"mere" threats but were enforced because the court felt bound to
protect the party named as the new beneficiary.26 Meeting the standard
set up for this exception required that the gift over must be an express
giving of a particular legacy and must create an immediate interest
at the time the testamentary condition is violated.2" Otherwise, no
forfeiture occurred.
Chief Justice John Marshall justified the little respect shown to
in terrorern conditions by observing:
Even when the forfeiture of the legacy has been declared to be the
penalty of not conforming to the injunction of the will, courts have
considered it, if the legacy be not given over, rather as an effort to
effect a desired object by intimidation, than as concluding the rights
of the parties. If any unreasonable use be made of the power, one
not forseen, and which could not be intended by the testator, it has
been considered as a case in which the general power of courts of
justice to decide on the rights of the parties ought to be exercised.28
Rather more acute than Marshall's interpretation is the comment
of a New York Court that in terrorem is simply a "convenient phrase
adopted by judges to stand in place of reasoning for refusing to give
effect to a valid condition."29  And even more compelling is Lord
Thurlow's remark that, "I do not find it was ever seriously supposed
to have been the testator's intention to hold out the terror of that which
he never meant to happen; but the Court disposed of such conditions
so as to make them amount to no more."' 0
Acknowledging that the in terrorem doctrine is "not based upon
any satisfactory reason," a Virginia court at the turn of the century
nevertheless held it to be settled law in that state, after having been
firmly fixed in England and applied once in Virginia without being
questioned. 3' Other courts, one as recently as 1961,2 have demanded
a gift over before giving credence to the testator's threats against con-
testing beneficiaries,3" sometimes holding that a general gift of the
2 See MeIlvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whart. 575 (Pa. 1838).
" Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810).
" Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 509, 516 (1828) (dicta).
" Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N.Y. 162, 171 (1882).
"Scott v. Tyler, 2 Dick. 712, 21 Eng. Rep. 448, 450 (1788). See also In re Dickson's
Trusts, 1 Sire. N.S. 37, 61 Eng. Rep. 15 (1850) ; Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149,
51 N.E.2d 48 (1943), where the court approaches the problem "with trepidation" because
of the confused background.
"1 Fifield v. Van Wyck's Executor, 94 Va. 557, 563, 27 S.E. 446, 448 (1897).
"See Broach v. Hester, 217 Ga. 59, 121 S.E.2d 111 (1961). See also Taylor v. Rapp,
217 Ga. 654, 124 S.E.2d 271 (1962).
as In re Arrowsmith, 162 App. Div. 623, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1914), afl'd, 213 N.Y. 704,
108 N.E. 1089 (1915) ; Sherwood v. McLaurin, 103 S.C. 370, 88 S.E. 363 (1916).
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residue fails to meet the exacting specifications of a valid gift over.3"
These remnants of the in terrorem concept might achieve a fair result
in a given case, but leave the impression that, without misstating the
testator's intent, courts should either find a forfeiture clause repugnant
and void or else give effect to the forfeiture. The wisest view adopted,
assuming that the condition is otherwise valid and applicable, is that
a forfeited legacy should pass to the general residuary legatees without
express words to that effect being demanded of the will.35 Since the
United States, as contrasted with England, has never suffered through
a conflict between ecclesiastical and temporal courts, there is no reason
for our courts to rest their decisions on "such an insecure foundation"
as in rerrorem3
Conflicting Views of the No-Contest Clause
The distribution of property after its owner's death is rigorously
controlled by statutory and case law, some aspects of which are so
fraught with confusion that an attorney may draft a defective will and
still not be charged with negligence. 7 Is it then surprising that conflicts
regularly arise over the extent of a testator's right to posthumously
dispose of his property by limiting a beneficiary's possible right to
object to that disposition? The undercurrent that threads its way
through these cases is usually the result of tension in measuring the
beneficiary's ingratitude or the testator's unfairness. A New York
court charmingly, but no doubt inaccurately, began to analyze the
validity of a no-contest clause by declaring:
The verity of the ancient adage respecting the untoward results of
canine realignment was never better illustrated than in the law relating
to the subject of testamentary stipulations which conditions benefits
upon an abstention by the legatee from contest of the will of the
donor.38
Whether contesting beneficiaries are actually trying to bite the
" See In re Arrowsmith, supra note 33.
" See Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 168 N.E. 574 (1929).
" See In re Htite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 445, 101 Pac. 443, 447 (1909).
" SeeLucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
" In re Brush's Estate, 154 Misc. 480, 277 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd as
to result, 247 App. Div. 760, 287 N.Y. Supp. 151 (1936).
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hand that fed them 9 or are seeking only to urge their constitutional
rights to remedy a wrong,4 is a question that can be answered only on
a case by case basis. Yet a court's very need to answer this question,
rather than to establish property rights for all testators, is itself the
subject of controversy. Throughout the various jurisdictions, there
are four major approaches to evaluating a no-contest clause, all of
which are discussed below. Largely depending on geography, the
clause may be either void, invalid because of its specific provisions,
valid, or valid except for the status of the contestant (as one in good
faith with probable cause to contest, or as a minor). Some courts make
further distinctions based on the theory of the contest, and treat allega-
tions of forgery and subsequent revocation by a later will with more
leniency than allegations about lack of testamentary capacity, fraud,
undue influence, or improper execution.41
This wide judicial choice makes it likely that no single approach is
socially disastrous or can be an exclusive source of justice. That being
true-at least in the author's opinion-we might do well to wonder
if a hard case in one jurisdiction would really make bad law through
the discretionary application of a rule that is good law in another
jurisdiction.
The No-Contest Clause Is Void
Only Indiana, so far as the author has been able to determine,
declares that any no-contest clause coupled with forfeiture is void.42
In one of the earliest American cases43 on this subject, however,
the author of the court's decision included his personal opinion that
such a condition is void as trenching on the "liberty of the law" and
violating public policy. What he said still merits consideration:
" See In re Sand's Estate, 64 Montg. 243, 62 York 153 (Pa. 1948).
40 See Will of Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925).
" See Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 95 S.E.2d 213 (1956), where the issue was not
properly raised.
12 INDIANA Acrs 1953 ch. 112, § 602, p. 295; 3 BuRNs STAT. § 6-602 (1953) : "If, in any
will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this state, there is a provision or provisions
providing that if any beneficiary thereunder shall take any proceeding to contest such will
or to prevent the admission thereof to probate, or provisions to that effect, such beneficiary
shall thereby forfeit any benefit which said will made for said beneficiary, such provision or
provisions shall be void and of no force or effect."
This statute, however, is not violated by a testamentary clause providing that if a
beneficiary is "dissatisfied" with the will, his shares revert to the estate and are to be dis-
tributed to the other heirs. Doyle v. Paul, 119 Ind. App. 632, 86 N.E.2d 98, 87 N.E.2d 885
(1949), where the dissatisfaction was evidenced by the fact that certain beneficiaries failed
to pay other beneficiaries $6,000.00 as a condition for receiving land under the will.
' Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12 (S.C. 1853).
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It is the interest of the State, that every legal owner should enjoy his
estate, and that no citizen should be obstructed by the risk of for-
feiture from ascertaining his rights by the law of the land. It may be
politic to encourage parties in the adjustment of doubtful rights by
arbitration or by private settlement; but it is against the fundamental
principles of justice and policy to inhibit a party from ascertaining
his rights by appeal to the tribunals established by the State to settle
and determine conflicting claims. If there be any such thing as public
policy, it must embrace the right of a citizen to have his claims
determined by law.4
Although these views have never been accepted in the absolute
manner framed by their judicial advocate, they do form the basis for
the "probable cause" exception to forfeitures.45
What No-Contest Clauses Are Invalid
Because no-contest clauses are drawn in many ways for many
specified purposes, even a jurisdiction which upholds the principle of
their validity may strike down a particular clause as invalid. This
suppression of testamentary intent can be brought about by a poorly
worded clause or, more commonly, by a clause that tries to limit the
beneficiaries in too broad or overwhelming a manner.
Treated as fatally defective was a provision that forbade a bene-
ficiary, on pain of forfeiture, from commencing or instituting any
proceedings at law or in equity touching or concerning or in any way
relating to the matters and things described in the will.46 The Master
of the Rolls seized upon the prohibitions against proceedings "in rela-
tion to" the devised property. Since the court cannot make any distinc-
tion between one action and another, he said, no devisee could take
proceedings to compel payment of rent, or bring an action of ejectment,
or have a servant indicted for embezzlement of rents. "The consequence
is that this provision is absurd, inconsistent and repugnant, and I have
no hesitation in saying that it constitutes no objection to the title."47
This forced reading of a simple enough prohibition can best be ex-
plained by our taking notice of the real issue in the case. All that was
disputed was whether or not the forfeiture clause, as such, prevented
"Id. at 20.
"See text at notes 87-111 infra.
'Rhodes v. Muswell Hill Land Co., 29 Beavan 560, 54 Eng. Rep. 745 (1861).
I" Id. at 564, 54 Eng. Rep. at 746.
Aug., 1963]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the beneficiary from giving good title to a would-be purchaser of the
devised land. Limited to those facts, the court's exertions are sensible
but once again show how awkward it often is to arrive at a proper result.
Other forfeiture clauses have been condemned by straightforward
reasoning which opposed the testator's attempts to severely inhibit his
beneficiaries' conduct. Stating that enforcement of one such clause
"would establish a vicious principle of law, dangerous in its effect, and
create a potential instrument of defense in the hands of a faithless or
negligent fiduciary," a Pennsylvania court4" refused to decree a for-
feiture threatened because the beneficiaries questioned the testatrix's
accounting as trustee of another estate. While litigation is to be dis-
couraged rather than incited, the court explained, it is equally true
that proper and honest litigation to redress injuries should not be
prevented, nor should access to the courts be impeded by threats of
reprisal or hopes of gratuities. With similar reasoning, a New York
court held invalid a clause that required all beneficiaries to acquiesce
in a written ratification and confirmation of the trustees' and executors'
administration of two inter vivos trusts, and to approve all acts and
things they did in administering the trusts and trust income.49 The
court remarked that the pursuit of counsel failed to reveal either an
American or an English case containing so drastic an in terrorem
provision. In its scope, the disputed clause was comprehensive enough
to cover the entire period of trust administration, and broad enough
to absolve the trustees from all responsibility for their actions, regard-
less of the legality of their conduct. Since New York has a real interest
in having its equity courts supervise trust administration, the testa-
mentary prohibition was ruled invalid for being inconsistent with the
state constitution and laws.
Another New York court, trying to resolve litigation where the
major beneficiaries stood neutral because of the forfeiture clause,"o
complained that "such apprehension deprives me to some extent of
the benefit of their counsel in the solution of difficulties. It seems to
me wrong in principle that a legatee may not even suggest a revocation
of a codicil without the fear of incurring a forfeiture of his legacy." 1
Addressing himself to forfeitures as a general problem, the surrogate
stated that the validity of no-contest conditions is limited to the extent
,"'In re Sand's Estate, 64 Montg. 243, 247, 62 York 153, 155 (Pa. 1948).
49 In re Andrus' Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N.Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
50 in re Kathan's Will, 141 N.Y. Supp. 705 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
"ibid.
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that no condition is enforced if it is contrary to the beneficiary's duty
or legal obligations, or to good morals, or to public order or public
policy. He specifically denounced two such clauses:
1. A condition against contesting a testamentary disposition that
is prohibited by statute. (The testator is thus trying to do what the law
expressly forbids, and is using the condition to further his own unlawful
intention.)
2. A condition against contesting the probate of a will which was
not executed according to statutory requirements. (The testator is
again trying to validate an illegal act and is attempting to obey the
statute of wills only as he sees fit to do so.)
The present author agrees with both these points. He nevertheless
recognizes that forfeiture clauses have nearly always been held valid
and enforceable against a beneficiary who had unsuccessfully claimed
a non-compliance with the local statute of wills. (The jurisdictions
which allow an exception for probable cause to contest approve the
basic validity of the clause, but not its particular application.) By
initially emphasizing these objections to validity, which represent a
minority view, the author has hoped to resist the numerical strength
of the majority position with some well-registered doubts. That the
no-contest clause has much to commend it will soon be made clear,
however.
The No-Contest Clause Is Valid
The single most important case upholding the validity of a no-contest
clause is probably Cooke v. Turner.5" To courts which uncritically
accept its supposed principles,53 there may be some interest in the
Vice-Chancellor's later announcement that: "This case appears to me
to be in a most singular position; and I cannot recollect any case that
at all resembles it.""
My Lord's perplexity derives from the fact that the oft-cited con-
troversy was fictitious, although Sir Gregory Osborne Page Turner,
the testator in question, had indeed been a certified lunatic for some
twenty years and had indeed executed a will which displeased his
daughter. Accordingly, in a lesser known decision 5 following soon
after the more publicized case, the Vice-Chancellor readily evaded the
" 15 M. & W. 727, 153 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1846).
" See, e.g., Matter of Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 38 Pac. 414 (1894), quoted with approval
in In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443 (1909).
" Cooke v. Turner, 15 Sim. 611, 60 Eng. Rep. 757, 761 (1847).
"Ibid. The facts given in the text have been taken from both the 1846 case before the
Barons of the Exchequer and from the 1847 case before the Vice-Chancellor. As necessary,
the source has been pinpointed.
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penalties suggested by the Barons of the Exchequer as a solution for
this dispute.
Sir Gregory, who had been declared a lunatic on two occasions, in
1823 and 1826, and who remained the subject of a lunacy commission
down to his dying hour, executed the disputed will in 1841. In it, he
provided that if any person were to dispute the will, or question his
competency to make it, or refuse to confirm it, all provisions in that
person's favor would be revoked. The daughter and her husband, to
raise an issue before the court, fabricated a statement in which they
disputed the will and the testator's competency to dispose of the prop-
erty, and further refused to do any act to confirm the will. Among the
considerations they raised was that the same solicitor who drew the will
and who insisted the testator was sane in making it, was also the solicitor
for Sir Gregory's lunacy commission, where the solicitor's conduct
showed that Sir Gregory had always remained a lunatic (albeit an
improved one).
The daughter's attorney argued:
It is the policy of the law to guard against the establishment of wills
made by persons who have been found lunatic according to the regular
forms of law. . . . It is, therefore, contrary to the policy of that law
to impose a prohibition upon the heir at law, of having the fact of the
testator's sanity ascertained. It cannot be a good condition, which
deprives the heir atlaw of the benefit intended for him, if he presumes
to institute an inquiry which the-law supposes.right. No other person
has authority to take care that the law is not transgressed in this
respect. There is no public officer who can do it on the part of the
public. . . . If this condition is upheld, there will be no will of an
incompetent person without such a clause, and the forgery of wills will
be greatly increased. The investigation can do no harm; if the testator
was competent, the will will be established; if he was not, it will be
set aside, which is the policy of the law."
In rejecting this plea and holding the forfeiture provision valid, the
Barons of the Exchequer articulated one of the fundamental justifica-
tions for this course:
There appears no more reason why a person may not be restrained
by a condition from disputing 'sanity, than from disputing any other
doubtful question of fact or law, on which-the title of a devisee or
grantee may depend. . . . The truth is, that in none of these cases
is there any policy of the law on the one side or the other. . . . There
5 Cooke v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727, 731, 733, 153 Eng. Rep. 1944, 1045, 1046 (1846).
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is no duty on the part of an heir, whether of perfect or imperfect
obligation, to contest his ancestor's sanity. It matters not to the state
whether the land is enjoyed by the heir or the devisee; and we con-
ceive, therefore, that the law leaves the parties to make just what
contracts and what arrangements they may think expedient, as to the
raising or not raising questions of law or fact among one another, the
sole result of which is to give the enjoyment of property to one
claimant rather than another. 57
That marvellous thrust-no one has a duty to contest his ancestor's
sanity-is no doubt responsible for obscuring what later developed
in this case. Yet it is the modifications which rescue this decision from
an otherwise absurd result.
On the hearing before the Vice-Chancellor of whether the will
should be admitted to probate, the daughter and her husband declined
to take any part because of the Barons' endorsement of the forfeiture
clause. The disappointed heiress, however, trusted that the court would
take care of their interests. Her faith was justified. The Vice-Chancellor
shrewdly commented, "my opinion is that that very clause, emanat-
ing as it did from the testator himself, tends to shew that he was
conscious that he was not in that state of mind in which the law requires
a man to be when he executes a will.""8 As a result, the Vice-Chancellor
directed that a jury should try the issue of devisavit vel non, to deter-
mine the status of the paper alleged to be a will. Neither the daughter
nor her husband were made susceptible to forfeiture, since the parties
at the trial were to be the trustees of the will, as its proponents, against
the trustee for the daughter's unborn children. True enough, much
judicial manipulating was necessary to give the unborn children suffi-
cient interest to become parties to the action, including a statement
that the real question is whether a fraud has been practiced on the Great
Seal. We should, no doubt, treat these manipulations as an unneces-
sarily equivocal attempt to install a rudimentary "good faith-probable
cause" exception into the area of forfeitures. Read in this light, which
the author believes to be more accurate than the common interpretation,
the two Cooke v. Turner decisions present an emphatic limitation on
no-contest clauses. 59
17 Id. at 734, 735, 736, 153 Eng. Rep. at 1047.
" Cooke v. Turner, 15 Sim. 611, 622, 60 Eng. Rep. 757, 762 (1947).
r9 We must admit that Stevenson v. Abington, 11 Week Rptr. 935 (1863), decided within
easy memory of Cooke v. Turner, holds that a beneficiary who violates a no-contest clause
will lose his legacy. The testator may "impose any condition he thought fit, however
capricious-as, for exemple, that the legatee should go to Rome." 11Week. Rptr. 936. But
see In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 AtL 853 (1904), as suggesting an interpretation
similar to the author's.
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No such limitation, as here contended, was adopted in Bradford
v. Bradford,6" the first American decision squarely to determine the
validity of a no-contest clause.6" The Ohio court, stating that nothing
can be more in conformity to good policy than to prevent litigation,
declared that no considerations of public policy require an heir to
contest the doubtful questions of fact or law on which may depend the
validity of a testamentary gift. "The determination of such questions
ordinarily affects only the interests of the parties to the controversy."62
So easily overlooked here is the premise that prevention of litiga-
tion is desirable, a premise vouched for by the California assertion
that public policy "deplores litigation.""3 Interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium: It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits. But
if our socially approved fashion of settling disputes can trouble its
own officials to such a degree, we might conclude that their aversion
stems from defects in our institutions rather than from misguided
impulses in the litigants. Why then should public policy permit further
barriers to a person's use of the only forum available to him, rather
than insist upon the creation of a suitable mechanism for the routine
dispensation of justice? We may agree that lawsuits can "waste away
vast estates, by protracted and extravagant litigation."64  Are we
therefore to resist apparently just claims on the implied ground that
our judicial processes are a luxury? Or could we, in weighing com-
peting values, restrict forfeiture penalties so that an unsuccessful
contestant (who should have been in good faith) will suffer no other
loss than bearing all litigation expenses arising from the contest?65
6019 Ohio St. 546 (1869).
"In Sackett v. Mallory, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 355 (1840), the court had before it a will
which provided for the forfeiture of a beneficiary's interest if he presented a claim against
the estate. The decision, however, concerned the rights of a non-contesting beneficiary, and
not the validity of a forfeiture. Apparently the court and the parties took for granted the
testators power to insert a valid clause of this type. Chews Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 228 (1863),
which discussed validity and probable cause to contest, was decided on the ground of whether
or not the beneficiary's particular acts had been prohibited.
" Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 548 (1869), which also held that a forfeited
legacy would pass to the general residuary legatees without express words to that effect.
Accord as to validity: Thompson v. Gaut, 14 Lea. 314 (Tenn. 1884).
"In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 439, 101 Pac. 443, 444 (1909).
04 See Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881).
"See In re Vom Saal's Will, 82 Misc. 531, 145 N.Y. Supp. 307 (Surr. Ct. 1913), where
a clause of this nature was held valid in regard to contested litigation, but invalid insofar
as it tried to penalize a person seeking construction of the will. See also Hoit v. Hoit,
42 N.J. Eq. 388, 7 AtI. 856 (1886), an early case which held that, despite a statute provid-
ing for payment of these expenses out of the estate itself, equity may compel a beneficiary
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There is, however, a substantial reason for denying a beneficiary
access to the courts because of what might be termed a testator's post-
hunous right to privacy: "De mortuis nil nisi bonum," raised into a
principle of law. Unless forfeiture clauses are given effect, the resulting
squabbles between disappointed kinfolk would often lead to "dis-
graceful family exposures, '""s as a result of which "the family skeleton
will have been made to dance." 7 In a classic statement, the United
States Supreme Court recognized (and sought to resolve) this problem:
Experience has shown that often after the death of a testator unex-
pected difficulties arise, technical rules of law are found to have been
trespassed upon, contests are commenced wherein not infrequently
are brought to light matters of private life that ought never to be
made public, and in respect to which the voice of the testator cannot
be heard either in explanation or denial, and as a result the manifest
intention of the testator is thwarted. It is not strange, in view of this,
that testators have desired to secure compliance with their dispositions
of property and have sought to incorporate provisions which should
operate most powerfully to accomplish that result. And when a testator
declares in his will that his several bequests are made upon the condi-
tion that the legatees acquiesce in the provisions of his will, the courts
wisely hold that no legatee shall without compliance with that condition
receive his bounty, or be put in a position to use it in the effort to
thwart his expressed purposes.0 8
For situations in which forgotten sins can be charged against a
necessarily-mute testator, the Supreme Court's analysis cannot be
faulted. We must recognize the vicious potential of a contest action
alleging some mental deficiency in the testator, as lack of testamentary
capacity or subjection to undue influence. The theory of the case
requires that the testator's express wishes be discredited by attacks
on his intellectual and emotional faculties. Permitting these verbal
to comply with the condition on which he has accepted the testator's bounty; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Blume, 92 N.J. Eq. 538, 114 AtL 423 (1921), which said that the word
"expenses" includes allowances for counsel fees and costs of the contest, plus all other
expenditures connected with the contest, such as allowances to the administrator and its
counsel and premiums for the necessary bonds.
Let it be understood, of course, that the reason the courts approved a limited penalty
in the cited cases is that the penalty was specified in the wills. The courts did not
minimize the beneficiaries' losses to satisfy principles suggested by the author, although
the Vom Saal decision edges in that direction by refusing to penalize one who desires to
have the will construed.
" See Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881).
"' See Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 70, 168 N.E. 574, 575 (1929). Accord:
Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N.E. 882 (1928).
"8 Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898).
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assaults would surely encourage a greater frequency of such litigation
-and yet penalizing the contesting beneficiaries without regard to
good faith or probable cause would be giving the dead a freedom
from litigation they could never have enjoyed in life and probably do
not appreciate in their buried state. If we momentarily ignore the force
of precedent, our choice is more a matter of good taste than good law.
For situations in which "technical rules of law are found to have
been trespassed upon," we can view the Supreme Court's statement from
a different perspective. The technical rules are the products of courts
and legislatures. Whether wise or foolish, the rules exist irrespective
of a beneficiary's reliance on their provisions. The beneficiary may
claim support from a particular section of the probate code but he
does not, so to speak, drag a forgotten incident into the light of day
to embarrass the testator's memory and profit himself. What is most
likely is that he embarrasses the court by stressing his delight with a
peculiar aspect of law. He might, for example, take as his guide a
California case6" which evaluated a proposed holographic will in terms
of a statutory requirement that such a will must be "entirely" written,
dated, and signed by the testator's hand. The body of the script pro-
posed as the will was entirely written and signed in the decedent's
handwriting, but the date was composed of two elements. The words
"April 1st" were in the proper handwriting, while the words "Sacra-
mento" and "1880" had been printed on the business letterhead which
the decedent had used. As the California Supreme Court ruled, the
purported will was invalid as being only partially written by him.
The words "April 1st" do not themselves constitute a date (although
they do commemorate a holiday on which such reasoning is highly
regarded).
Given a similar situation, why should a beneficiary not take advan-
tage of it?7" If we say that the technicality is absurd, we must also
note that it is still good law, at least up to the moment when the bene-
ficiary loses his contest. The court's posture should take into account
In re Billing's Estate, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884).
o See, e.g., Irwin v. Jacques, 71 Ohio St. 395, 73 N.E. 683 (1905), where the no-contest
clause itself was the disputed technicality. Under a state statute the testator's signature had
to he at the end of the will. Here, however, a no-contest clause had been inserted in the
left-hand margin of the document. Against contentions that the no-contest clause was
surplusage that could not affect the validity of the will, the court declared that the clause
was dispositive, may in certain events change the course of some or all of the decedent's
property, and must he properly located in the instrument for a determination of whether
the will had been signed at the end. Since the no-contest clause was misplaced, the docu-
ment was held not to he the decedent's last will and testament.
(Vol 15
NO-CONTEST CLAUSES IN WILLS
the fact that enforcement of statutes of wills is a job delegated in
practice to private citizens, the decedent's heirs or beneficiaries. Either
they call a "technical" violation to the court's attention or the violation
will probably pass unnoticed. Can we then allow a testator to forbid
his beneficiaries from urging the applicability of legislation or judicial
precedent? Or should we say, as the author does, that an individual is
to be encouraged to demand obedience to established law, even if he
profits as a result? The wisdom of the particular law must be deter-
mined in an entirely different context.
We are dealing, as we must remember, with unilateral actions by
the testator that tend to deprive others of benefits in a way not accept-
able to legal standards (or, at least, apparently not acceptable). Had
the testator during his lifetime obtained an agreement with his prospec-
tive heirs about the distribution of his estate, we could readily approve
the principles stated in an early California decision:
[W] e see no reason why persons whose rights of property would be
affected by the decision of such questions may not in advance, for an
adequate consideration, waive their right to engage in such litigation.
Such a contract is one that concerns the parties alone, and does not
appear to us to be against public policy. There never has been any
doubt that parties actually engaged in contesting a will upon any of
the grounds upon which such contests are permitted may compromise
all matters in difference arising out of such contest, and allow the
disputed will to be established, and such agreements, when fairly made,
are always enforced. It is difficult to understand why such a compro-
mise agreement is any less against public policy than an agreement
made by an heir apparent or heir presumptive with his ancestors not
to contest a future will of the latter.71
Perhaps an objection could be made that such an agreement would
simply create a conspiracy to evade the law, and thereby defeat the
public interest as resoundingly as the testator's exclusive actions. This
objection should be overcome with the realization that public interest
lies in establishing safeguards that make an individual pause before
executing a document which divides his property in a manner different
from the local law of intestacy. The consenting heirs would properly
be barred from trying to overturn the will because beneficial statutes
(such as the statutes of limitations and of frauds) can be disregarded
by the affected parties and because public policy, however elastic the
phrase, need not trouble itself over the specific amount each consenting
beneficiary receives. Heirs who refused to agree in advance with the
" Matter of Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 591-92, 38 Pac. 414, 420 (1894). Accord: Matter of
Cook, 244 N.Y. 63, 154 N.E. 823 (1926).
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testator's disposition of property would, under this theory, still have
the right to bring a good faith action, on probable cause, to block
probate of the will.
Nevertheless, many courts support the New Jersey doctrine72 that
a testator may say: "Take what I offer or nothing at all.""3 The justi-
fication for this position was early stated and often followed:
The testator possessed the right of disposing of his property as he saw
fit, so long as he violated no law or established principle of sound
public policy. He could bestow or withhold benefactions, as an attri-
bute of the jus-disponendi, without regard to considerations of justice,
or of caprice.74
While the wisdom of inserting a forfeiture clause may be open to
question, the law does not require that the testamentary distribution
be wise or even equitable provided the testator has clearly expressed
his intention.75 Since the due process clauses of the federal and state
constitutions inhibit the powers of the governments, and not a private
person's freedom of action, he has the right to dispose of his own
property. 76 He need not, in so doing, consult or follow the wishes or
views of his heirs or beneficiaries, or of courts or juries.7 It is true
that a forfeiture clause is to be strictly construed, but it is equally
true that if the provisions are not strictu'red by law or by public policy
they will be enforced according to the ascertained intent of the testator."'
The only question a beneficiary has to decide is the ordinary one arising
"2 Provident Trust v. Osborne, 133 N.J. Eq. 518, 33 A.2d 103 (1943).
"' See the following cases, arranged chronologically so that one can more easily trace the
development of this view:
Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501 (1881) ; In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443
(1909) ; In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842 (1909) ; Gibson v. Gibson, 280 Mo.
519, 219 S.W. 561 (1920) ; In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 220 Pac. 301 (1923) ; O'Donnell v.
Jackson, 102 N.E. Eq. 470, 141 Ad. 450 (1928) ; Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 168
N.E. 574 (1929) ; Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929) ; In re Chamber's
Estate, 322 Mo. 1086, 18 S.W.2d 30 (1929) ; Cross v. French, 118 N.J. Eq. 85, 177 AUt. 456
(1935), modified on another point, 119 N.J. Eq. 563, 182 At]. 834 (1936) ; Blevins v. Pitt-
man, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 (1940) ; In re Markham's Estate, 46 Cal. App. 2d 307, 115
P.2d 866 (1941) ; Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ;
In re Howard's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945) ; Alper v. Alper, 2 N.J. 105,
65 A.2d 737 (1949) ; In re Houston's Estate, 371 Pa. 396, 89 A.2d 525 (1952) ; Sullivan v.
Bond, 198 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; In re Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 300 P.2d
342 (1956) ; Elder v. Elder, 84 R.L 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956).
'
4 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881).
76 In re Houston's Estate, 371 Pa. 396, 89 A.2d 525 (1952).
'6 In re Chamber's Estate, 322 Mo. 1086, 18 S.W.2d 30 (1929).
7 1n re Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 300 P.2d 342 (1956). But see text at
notes 192-98 infra for the proposition that this may be an incorrect view of California law.
7 9 In re Markham's Estate, 46 Cal. App. 2d 307, 115 P.2d 866 (1941).
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from almost every business transaction: Is the thing offered worth the
price demanded? 9
Despite arguments that this policy disrupts family relationships,
induces family strife, invites fraudulent arrangements whereby a
residuary legatee can profit unconscionably, and leads to unfair domi-
nation of the beneficiaries, courts have allowed the testator to demand
forfeitures because he could have so arranged his entire estate in the
first instance."0 The forfeiture clause cannot restrain a beneficiary's
liberty of action since it becomes material only after he has unsuccess-
fully contested the will."1 Studies which have been made, according
to a United States Court of Appeals, show that
only a very small percentage of will contests made on the grounds
of defective execution, mental incapacity or undue influence are suc-
cessful; and the public interest in freeing such contests from the
restraining influence of conditions like that here involved seems of
little importance compared with enforcing the will of the testator that
those who share in his bounty shall not have been guilty of besmirch-
ing his reputation or parading the family skeletons after his death . 2
To maintain any other position, as pointed out in dissent by the
Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, is to assume that the con-
testant will fail in his attempt to defeat the will. 3 He should and
would fail, as he should and would fail in any other action he might
bring, if he lacked sufficient evidence to support his cause. But given
a true contest entered into on good grounds and supported by sufficient
testimony, "it may be assumed that the courts will correctly decide."8 4
Unless we believe that our legal system has broken down and that
the deserving party regularly loses, we must agree that unsuccessful
contestants were probably wrong in attacking the will. Using hind-
sight, we should recognize that those contests ought never to have been
"D In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 220 Pac. 301 (1923).
" See Alper v. Alper, 2 N.J. 105, 65 A.2d 737 (1949), which indicates through dicta
that a probable cause exception would be proper in cases of alleged forgery or subsequent
revocation, but not of fraud, undue influence, improper execution, or lack of testamentary
capacity.
s' Elder v. Eider, 84 R.I. 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956).
82Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
8 In re Cocklin's Estate, 235 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
Cocklin overruled that part of Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909), which
refused to allow a probable cause exception to the forfeiture rule.
"' In re Cocklin's Estate, 235 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129, 137 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
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brought. Are we therefore justified in punishing these mistakes (on
the testator's insistence) under the aegis of public policy? Or should
we consider, as does another judge speaking in dissent, the probability
that a "litigious troublemaker" will not be restrained by a no-contest
clause but that
The person who will be discouraged and restrained is just the person
whose right, to litigate, the public policy should be most concerned to
protect: poor, timid people; children, widows, incompetents. It is
against the interests of such persons that the schemer, the confidence-
man and the ruthless rascal are most apt to operate. If fraud, coercion
and undue influence-rarely as they now may be used in procuring
the execution of wills-can be covered up and made secure by the
insertion of a forfeiture condition into a will, then, far from establish-
ing a beneficial rule of public policy, we may, instead, be putting
another weapon into the hands of the racketeer.8 5
At this cross-fire, we are well-advised to investigate the purpose ani
applicability of the good faith-probable cause exception that is used
in many jurisdictions where the no-contest clause is otherwise valid."8
"Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (dis-
senting opinion).
" Several hard-to-categorize matters associated with valid no-contest clauses should be
mentioned here:
Against a claim that a no-contest clause was not a dispositive provision of the will, but
a mere expression of the testator's wish or desire, addressed to no particular person and
entirely ineffective to bring about a forfeiture, In re Shirley's Estate, 180 Cal. 400, 181 Pac.
777 (1919), held that where words dispose of property or impose a condition on a bequest
given elsewhere in the will, they need not be addressed to anyone. It is enough that they
show the intent and will of the testator regarding the property or legacy and the court will
distribute the estate as so provided.
If a beneficiary first receives her legacy and then seeks to bring a contest, insisting
that she may retain the legacy unless and until the will is found valid and a forfeiture de-
creed, Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 168 N.E. 574 (1929), authorizes judgment on
the pleadings against her. "To place a beneficiary in funds, which he is unwilling to return,
and undoubtedly in most instances is unable to do at the end of the contest, is to promote
litigation, which in the great majority of cases will result only in the affirmance of the will."
Id. at 70, 168 N.E. at 575. See also In re Grote's Estate, 2 How. Prac. (N.S.) 140 (N.Y.
Surr. Ct. 1885).
The forfeiture clause in a will is not self-executing. If one beneficiary violates a for-
feiture clause, his action gives the beneficiary of the gift-over no more than a right to the
devised land; the second beneficiary is not obliged to assert this right to benefit his credi-
tors. De Rousse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N.W. 896 (1917).
It is proper to award the forfeited- shares under a will only to the beneficiaries who
firmly supported the will during a contest, and to give no part of those shares to beneficiaries
who stood neutral throughout the litigation. Whitehurst v. Gotwalt, 189 N.C. 577, 127
S.E. 582 (1925).
Even though a beneficiary may be "among the ones not contesting," he is entitled to
no part of the forfeited shares where he is a stranger to the blood, has no interest in the
estate, could not have contested the will if he so desired, and had received as his legacy
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The No-Contest Clause Is Valid, But
An impressive number of courts adheres to the view that no for-
feiture will result from an attack on a will by a good faith beneficiary
with probable cause to contest ." In taking this stance, the courts offer
many vigorous reasons but slide over or ignore the price which must be
paid when this rule is allowed to operate. It is misleading, the author
believes, for a court to say that if a contested will is later held valid,
"no harm has been done through the contest, except the delay and the
attendant expense.""5 Depending on the equanimity and economic needs
of the parties, this mild harm might result from a contest limited to
the purely formal matters attending statutory execution. But whai of
a contest levelled at the testator's emotional and intellectual capacities?
Should we not admit that:
Contests over the allowance of wills frequently, if not invariably, result
in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs, conduct,
idiosyncracies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of
the testator, when he is not alive and cannot explain what may without
explanation be given a sinister appearance. To most persons such.
just some second-hand furniture. Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929).
A contesting beneficiary may lose her rights under the will but, on proper proof, can
take a community interest in the estate, In re Harvey's Estate, 164 Cal. App. 2d 330, 330
P.2d 478 (1958), or can take as an heir of the class meant to be protected from excessive
charitable gifts by the testator, In re Holtermann's Estate, 206 Cal. App. 2d 460, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (1962). Whether one is entitled to succeed as an heir at law to any portion of
the forfeited legacy depends on whether the testatrix made a valid disposition of the
property. In re Lefranc's Estate, 38 Ca]. 2d 289, 239 P.2d 617 (1952). See also Hurley v.
Blankenship, 267 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1954).
"' See the following cases, arranged chronologically so that one can more easily trace
the development of this view:
Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa. St. 228 (1863) (dicta) ; Jackson v. Westerfield, 61 How. Pr. 399
(N.Y. 1881) ; In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 AtL 853 (1904) ; Rouse v. Branch, 91
S.C. 111, 74 S.E. 133 (1912); South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Atl.
961 (1917) ; Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922) ; In re Chappell's Estate,
127 Wash. 638, 221 Pac. 336 (1923) ; Will of Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N.W. 1001 (1925) ;
Dutterer v. Logan, 103 W.Va. 216, 137 S.E. 1 (1927) ; Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 428,
259 Pac. 299 (1927), ajJd on rehearing, 125 Ore. 428, 266 Pac. 875 (1928); Calvery v.
Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932) ; First M.E. Church South v. Anderson, 110
S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129
(1945) (overruling Moran v. Moran. 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909), on this point) ;
Jensen v. Nelson, 236 Iowa 569, 19 N.W.2d 596 (1945) ; Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28
So. 2d 890 (1946) ; Geisinger v. Geisinger, 241 Iowa 283, 41 N.W.2d 86 (1950) ; Burtman v.
Burtman, 97 N.H. 254, 85 A.2d 892 (1952) ; Ryan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.C.
585, 70 S.E.2d 853 (1952) ; Hartz' Estate v. Cade, 247 Minn. 362, 77 N.W.2d 169 (1956) ;
Kolb v. Levy, 110 So. 2d 25 (Fla. App. 1959) ; In re Pellicer's Estate, 118 So. 2d 59 (Fla.
App. 1960).
" South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 At. 961, 963 (1917).
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exposure to publicity of their own personality is distasteful, if not
abhorrent. 89
The anthropomorphic assumption that a dead man can find any-
thing distasteful or abhorrent is reasonable when we acknowledge that
this fear might upset a testator during his lifetime. Should he be made
a target of aspersions simply because he accumulated enough property
to tempt his heirs? As previously indicated,9 ° the matter appears to
be one of personal inclination, measured by subjective reactions that
are difficult to codify and often impossible to justify. To support the
good faith-probable cause exception, as the author does, requires us
to accept its defects at their full value. But since "Perfection is not
required even in sidewalks,"'" much less from active legal principles,
we may openly accept the imperfections of the best available rule of
law without being driven to apology or to the adoption of a worse rule.
That said, we should examine the substantive reasons for main-
taining this outlook.
Because the law is vitally interested in having property transmitted
by wills bestowed under specified conditions, and no others, it prescribes
who may make a will, how the will shall be made, that the will must
be executed in a certain mode, and that the person making the will
must have testamentary capacity, be acting freely, and not be the
subject of undue influence.92 Until all material facts are placed before
it, a court cannot know whether a will good on its face was made in
conformity with statutory requirements and judicial decisions. These
facts are brought to the court only by those who have an interest in
the will. If, then, beneficiaries are forced to remain silent under penalty
of forfeiture, courts will be prevented from ascertaining the truth.9"
As a Wisconsin court asked:
Is it not against public policy to permit one person to deprive another
from asserting his rights in court? And especially so before it is
ascertained that the prohibition against contest is in fact that of the
testator and not that of one exercising undue influence over him, or
that he was competent to make it?
94
9 See Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 500, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (1928).
'o See text at notes 66.68 supra.
91Vellante v. Town of Watertown, 300 Mass. 207, 208, 14 N.E.2d 955, 956 (1938).
"' South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Atl. 961 (1917).
"' South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, supra note 92; Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294,
28 So. 2d 890 (1946). The South Norwalk court eventually decreed a forfeiture, even though
all beneficiaries (including the residuary beneficiary) were willing to waive this punishment
against a contestant. If the forfeiture clause is applicable, the court said, it is the testator's
right and cannot be waived by the beneficiaries.
, Will of Keenan, 188 Wis. 163, 176, 205 N.W. 1001, 1006 (1925).
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Fears about the encouragement of vice and the debasement of
virtue prompt these courts to recognize the good faith-probable cause
exception. When the no-contest clause is universally applied, the very
persons who may have been instrumental in the creation of an invalid
document and who are to profit most by its admission to probate are
given a helpful cover for their wrongful acts or designs. 5 Individuals
who take advantage of their power to influence a testator in the execu-
tion of a will "will artfully have a care to have inserted in it a clause
to shut off all inquiry as to the influence which really made the will";
if strict forfeitures were tolerated, "those who unscrupulously play
upon the feelings of the testator may, with impunity, enjoy the fruits
of their iniquity and laugh in scorn at those whom they have
wronged." 96
As to the debasement of virtue, courts have recognized that a bene-
ficiary who knows of a fraud but, for fear of losing his legacy, silently
stands by and accepts his share is morally a party to the fraud.97 This
is especially true when there is a reasonable belief that the will is a
forgery:
If a devisee should accept the fruits of the crime of forgery under the
belief, and upon probable cause, that it was a forgery, he would
thereby become morally a particeps criminis, and yet, if he is unwilling
to commit this moral crime, be confronted with the alternative of doing
so, or of taking the risk of losing all under the will, in case it should be
found not to be a forgery. Public policy forbids that he should be
tempted in such a manner. 9s
To respect this position is to hearken back (properly, the author
believes) to Chew's Appeal,99 which was the first American case that
analyzed a forfeiture clause of the no-contest variety. In stating as
dicta that no forfeiture would result from a contest based on probable
cause, the Pennsylvania court said:
Undoubtedly, I think, no provision could be formed to oust the super-
Hartz' Estate v. Cade, 247 Minn. 362, 77 N.W.2d 169 (1956).
In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 444, 58 AtL. 853, 854 (1904).
In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945). Cocklin overruled
Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909), which had previously denied the
probable cause exception. An attempt to induce the Missouri Supreme Court to change its
position as a result of the Cocklin change failed. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed, 318
S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1958), stating that the rule against allowing the exception "rests upon a
sound logical foundation and is supported by substantial authority." Id. at 301.
" Rouse v. Branch, 91 S.C. 111, 118, 74 S.E. 133, 135 (1912). Cf. In re Bergland's
Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 Pac. 277 (1919).
Il 45 Pa. St. 228 (1863).
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visory power of the law over such conditions and limitations, to control
them within their legitimate sphere, which is generally to prevent
vexatious litigation.' 0 0
The philosophy which rejects this exception impliedly labels all
litigation as "vexatious." Some litigation undoubtedly is so; some
crops up because the law itself is confused;..1 and much arises because
honest people, with financial bias but not necessarily with malice,
reasonably believe their rights have been tampered with. Is it proper
to classify the sincerely motivated individuals, having probable cause
for their recourse to law and so certified in court, as striving to erect
nothing but "an artificial distinction to avoid the force of a plain and
unambiguous condition against contests"?. 2 The author submits not.
He contends that courts, which are readily accessible to beneficiaries
who seek to construe the testator's intent in a will that is not ques-
tioned, 0 3 should be equally accessible to those who in good faith and
with probable cause seek to have the genuineness of a purported will
determined. 0 He would recognize probable cause as existing in
situations when a son, erroneously believing that California law gov-
erned distribution (instead of the Washington law that prevailed),
claimed that a testamentary trust was void;"05 when an illegitimate
daughter, whose status was denied in the will, sought to be named as
the decedent's sole heir;. 6 when the decedent had previously been
100 Id. at 232.
.01 See Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (1932), which allowed a good
faith-probable cause exception to contested devises of real estate. In Calvery, a beneficiary
was alleged to have forfeited her devise because she had filed an unsuccessful suit to construe
the will so as to remove a cloud on title and to establish her fee simple interest in the
property. Said the court, in partial justification for the beneficiary's conduct: "The rule in
Shelley's Case has always been a subject of much controversy. The courts, text-witers, and
lawyers have often disagreed in the construction of the rule. The courts of this state have
not been in accord in the construction and application of the rule to wills and deeds, and
the opinions have by no means been uniform." Id. at 212, 55 S.W.2d at 530.
1o2 See In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 122, 103 Pac. 842, 844 (1909), which states
that a testator has the lawful right to dispose of his property on whatever condition he
desires, as long as the condition is not prohibited by some law or is opposed to public
policy, such as conditions in restraint of marriage or of lawful trade. See also Rudd v.
Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N.E. 882 (1928), which says that allowing the probable cause
exception would defeat the rights of the donee of the gift over. But. cf. In re Bergland's
Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 Pac. 277 (1919).
10. See text at notes 119-28 infra.
"" See Ryan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.C. 585, 70 S.E.2d 853 (1952).
105 See In re Chappell's Estate, 127 Wash. 638, 221 Pac. 336 (1923). See also In re
Hill's Estate, 176 Cal. 619, 169 Pac. 371 (1917).
100 See Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 428, 259 Pac. 299 (1927), affd on rehearing,
125 Ore. 428, 266 Pac. 875 (1928).
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found of unsound mind and once had a committee of her person and
estate appointed; 0 7 when the testator, who was in weak physical condi-
tion just before executing the will, had often expressed a desire to
equally divide his property among his children, but unexpectedly
favored a domineering son who "lorded it" over the deceased;"'8
when a son had always been on the best of terms with his sick, eighty-
one-year-old father and had been given practically all the estate in a
will executed two years before the disputed will;'0° and when' there
had been a presumption of equality among the children but there was
a gross disproportion between the shares they received, and when the
chief beneficiary had dominated the decedent and was persistently
hostile to the other children."10
The test of probable cause for initiating these contest proceedings
should be that the contestant reasonably believes in the existence of
facts on which his claim is based, and either reasonably believes that
these facts would establish his claim under common or statutory law,
or so believes on advice of counsel. Advice of counsel, to be operative,
must be received after a full and fair disclosure of all matters bearing
on the case, and must be acted on in good faith with the belief that
there was good cause for the proceeding."'
Always competing against this exception, of course, is the insistence
on a testator's right to dispose of his property as he sees fit. Subscribers
to that view should either dismantle all statutory and judicial controls
over the testamentary disposition of property, or should recognize that
obedience to a probate code may often lead an honest beneficiary
astray.
What Acts Are Sufficiently Hostile to Work a Forfeiture?
Disappointed beneficiaries express themselves in many ways, but
often without penalty because the acts they perform fall outside the
ban of a no-contest clause. As a result of the wide variety of testa-
107 See Jackson v. Westerfield, 61 How. Pr. 399 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1881).
100 See Dutterer v. Logan, 103 W.Va. 216, 137 S.E. 1 (1927).
10' See Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922).
110 See In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853 (1904).
... See Geisinger v. Geisinger, 241 Iowa 283, 41 N.W.2d 86 (1950). See also Dutterer v.
Logan, 103 W.Va. 216, 137 S.E. 1 (1927), where the employment of "able, honorable, and
distinguished counsel" influenced the finding of probable cause. But cf. In re Friend's
Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 At. 853 (1904), which lets advice of counsel be taken into account
but gives it little weight-else there would always be probable cause. See Wollard v.
Ferrell, 26 Tenn. App. 197, 169 S.W.2d 134 (1943), which states that probable cause does
not depend on the actual state of the case in point of fact, but on the honest and reasonable
belief of the party instituting the action.
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mentary provisions, general rules cannot be laid down on what consti-
tutes a contest or an attempt to defeat a will."' What can freely be
said is that a no-contest clause is construed strictly against forfeiture
and reasonably in favor of the beneficiary."' The generosity sug-
gested by such a view, however, has an important limitation spelled
out by the California Supreme Court:
The rule that a forfeiture clause is to be strictly construed means
simply that no wider scope is to be given to the language employed
than is plainly required. It does not require the court to put a
strained or overtechnical construction upon the language employed,
ignoring the essence of the condition imposed upon the legacy and
refusing to give effect to the lawful intention of the testatrix to enable
a legatee to affirm a will so far as it is to her own profit and at the
same time repudiate the validity of its provisions which are for the
benefit of others. No artificial distinctions are to be taken advantage
of or quibbling indulged in to the end that a person plainly and
palpably coming within the scope of the forfeiture clause may "by some
hook or crook" escape the penalty of forfeiture.1 14
From the author's observations, this limitation must itself be modi-
fied by the recognition that "hook or crook" condemnation does not
necessarily prevent activity tending to defeat the provisions of the
will if defeat is "but incidental and is not the primary object" of the
beneficiary's action."' Courts often recognize the principle of "double
effect," 16 an aspect of moral theology under which an action, not in
itself intrinsically evil, may be performed, even though followed by
both a good and a bad result, if the good and not the evil effect is
directly intended, the good effect is not produced by means of the evil,
and a grave reason exists for permitting the evil to occur. (Courts, by
the way, have not specifically identified their reasoning as matching
the theological category.) So, for example, it is manifestly unconscion-
able to apply a forfeiture provision against a beneficiary who, appear-
ing first as a defendant and then as an appellant, urged that certain
"'
2Kolb v. Levy, 110 So. 2d 25 (Fla. App. 1959).
... See, e.g., In re Lummis' Estate, 126 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. N.J. 1954); In re Crisler's
Estate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 198, 217 P.2d 470 (1950). This proposition is restated in most cases
involving these forfeitures.
... In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 389-90, 220 Pac. 301, 303 (1923).
... See In re Bergland's Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 635, 182 Pac. 277, 280 (1919), which
deals with an attempt to probate a purported later will and is of more restricted scope
than the author's inclinations.
... For discussions of the double effect in other contexts, see ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE,
DEATH, AND THE LAW 190 (1961); LEBUFFE AND HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 364-67 (4th ed. 1947).
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testamentary clauses were of no force and effect, when she was "cer-
tainly under something in the nature of a contractual agreement" to
take the position she did.' 17 But it is proper to declare a forfeiture
when the beneficiary had unsuccessfully attacked the testator's compe-
tence, notwithstanding her contention that she did not primarily seek
to defeat the will but rather to establish a trust, and that the will's
being impaired or totally destroyed was just a secondary or incidental
result. 1 ' Without doubt, the most popular form of taking advantage
of the court's leniency is the suit for construction of a will according
to the beneficiary's expectations.
Precedent in bulk is available to show that a declaratory action
brought to construe a will is not a contest within the scope of a for-
feiture clause. 19  (A few courts have ruled otherwise. 2 ) The action
1 Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 25 Ill. 2d 280, 184 N.E.2d 874 (1962). Cf. In re
Bradenhop's Estate, 61 N.J. Super. 526, 161 A.2d 318 (1960).
" See In re Markham's Estate, 46 Cal. App. 2d 307, 115 P.2d 866 (1941), which was
decided on the basis of the testator's virtually unlimited right to dispose of his property as
he saw fit. The case is cited here to show that the "double effect" philosophy, though often
unsuccessful, is still used.
11 See the following cases, arranged chronologically so that one can more easily trace
the development of this view:
Scott v. Ives, 22 Misc. 749, 51 N.Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; South Norwalk Trust Co.
v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 AtL 961 (1917) (dicta) ; Perry v. Perry, 175 N.C. 141, 95
S.E. 98 (1918); Unger v. Loewy, 202 App. Div. 213, 195 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1922) ; Fellion's
Estate, 132 Misc. 805, 231 N.Y. Supp. 9 (Surr. Ct. 1928) ; In re Storey's Will, 134 Misc. 791,
236 N.Y. Supp. 518 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; Estate of Kline 138 CaL App. 514, 32 P.2d 677 (1934) ;
First M.E. Church South v. Anderson, 110 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Federal
Trust Co. v. Ost, 120 N.J. Eq. 43, 183 Atl. 830, 120 N.J. Eq. 475, 186 AUt. 579 (1936), aff'd,
121 NJ. Eq. 608, 191 At. 746 (1937) ; In re Brisacher's Estate, 27 Cal. App. 2d 327, 80
P.2d 1033 (1938); Girard Trust Co. v. Mueller, 125 N.J. Eq. 597, 7 A.2d 413 (1939);
Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 51 N.E.2d 48 (1943) ; Bottomley v. Bottomley,
134 N.J. Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475 (1944) ; Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944) ;
Jensen v. Nelson, 236 Iowa 569, 19 N.W.2d 596 (1945); Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28
So. 2d 881 (1946) ; Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So. 2d 890 (1946) ; Upham v.
Upham, 200 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Shelley v. Creighton, 140 N.J. Eq. 603,
55 A.2d 646 (1947); Cohen v. Reisman, 203 Ga. 684, 48 S.E.2d 113 (1948); Hawley v.
Trenton Banking Co., 3 N.J. Super. 304, 65 A.2d 84 (1949); Morrison v. Reed, 6 N.J.
Super. 598, 70 A.2d 799 (1950) ; Marx v. Rice, 1 N.J. 574, 65 A.2d 48 (1949) ; Kirkhride
v. Hickock, 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951) ; In re Ervin's Estate, 367 Pa. 58, 79
A.2d 264 (1951) ; Roberts v. Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Bankers Trust
Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 99 A.2d 224 (1953) ; Dravo v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
267 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1954); In re Folsom's Will, 142 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Ken-
tucky Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 163 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Ky. 1958); Colorado Nat. Bank v.
McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 353 P.2d 385 (1960) ; In re Greenfield's Will, 13 App. Div. 2d 846,
216 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1961).
"0 Lytle v. Zebold, 357 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1962), which states that a petition, though
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does not seek to annul or vacate any part of the will, nor to defeat the
testator's expressed intention as to the beneficiary's share in the estate.
Affirming the terms of the will, the suit seeks only to establish the
beneficiary's rights as he asserts them and to give effect to the testator's
real intent, according to the beneficiary's interpretation.12' The object
is to fulfill the testator's intention, not to avoid it, by ascertaining and
protecting the beneficiary's own gift.122  The beneficiary does dispute
the interpretation that someone else has placed upon the will, but
simply asks the court to construe those provisions which are differently
interpreted. 2 ' From questions about the identity of a "diamond
wedding ring"' 24 to those about the validity of charitable gifts, 25
these suits are helpful in implementing the will.
Courts, however, remain aware of the abuse to which the declaratory
action may be put in advancing a beneficiary's interests. To guard
against the danger of unlimited litigation framed as simple bills for
construction, many jurisdictiois have created what might be termed
a "pleading test": Who filed firs.t? If an executor, a trustee, or someone
else has taken the initiative in raising issues about the validity of
testamentary gifts, then a beneficiary may, withbut fear of an other-
wise-likely forfeiture, state his position on the matter and himself
question the validity of testamentary provisions. 2 ' This principle is
claimed to seek merely a construction of the will, is to be treated as the very type of
proceeding the testator intended to forbid when it contends that the testamentary trust
was invalid and that the property should be distributed as if the testator had died intestate;
Lanier v. Lanier, 218 Ga. 137, 126 S.E.2d 776 (1962), which states that a declaratory action,
seeking to determine if the will violated the rule against perpetuities, is an action contesting
the validity of the will and, when there is a limitation over of the gift, leads to a forfeiture;
O'Donnell v. Jackson, 102 N.J. Eq. 470, 141 At. 450 (1928), which was a case of first
impression that has apparently not influenced later New Jersey law, though cited in Provident
Trust v. Osborne, 133 N.J. Eq. 518, 33 A.2d 103 (1943), to support a factually distinguish-
able result.
"'
1 Dravo v. Libertk Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 267 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1954). (Emphasis
added.)
.2 Marx v. Rice, 1 N.J. 574, 65 A.2d 48 (1949). See also Kentucky Trust Co. v.
Sweeney, 163 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Ky. 1958).
122 Morrison v. Reed, 6 N.J. Super. 598, 70 A.2d 799 (1950).
124 See In re Brisacher's Estate, 27 Cal. App. 2d 327, 80 P.2d 1033 (1938).
1' See Estate of Klein, 138 Cal. App. 514, 32 P.2d 677 (1934) ; Kirkbride v. Hickock,
155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951); In re Ervin's Estate, 367 Pa. 58, 79 A.2d 264
(1951) ; Unger v. Loewy, 202 App. Div. 213, 195 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1922); Scott v. Ives,
22 Misc. 749, 51 N.Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
.6 Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758, (1944) ; Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134
NJ. Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475 (1944). See also Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So. 2d 890
(1946) ; Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 51 N.E.2d 48 (1943). And see Kirk-
bride v. Hickock, 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951), where the testator's children
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well articulated in a proceeding where a testator's widow came "peril-
ously near" to contesting the will in her defensive assault on a trust
provision, despite her disclaimers that all she did was assist the court
in making a proper determination:
If this were a suit brought by the widow for the purpose of having the
will so construed as to render invalid the trusts therein constructed,
I should have little hesitancy in holding that she had by such conduct
offended against the prohibitions of the will and had forfeited her
right to take under it. The controlling circumstance, it seems to me,
is the fact that the questions are presented by the executor who draws
the beneficiaries into the argument. It would be grossly unfair in
such circumstances to visit upon the beneficiary expressing himself the
penalty of forfeiting his share of the estate. The beneficiary need not
stand mute and the law will not by the threat of forfeiture compel his
silence when questions are propounded by another touching the right
and interest of the beneficiary under the will. A contrary rule would
make the suit for the construction of a will a unilateral proceeding
and the presence in such cause of the beneficiaries as defendants could
well be dispensed with. It seems to me that when the language of a
will is under investigation and the testator's intention is being inquired
into a beneficiary may freely speak, when brought into the cause,
without incurring the penalties provided in the will against a contesting
beneficiary, even though while so speaking the beneficiary contends for
a construction which will by operation of law render provisions of the
will invalid.'2 7
What makes this view especially pleasing to the author is the fact
that it derives from the same jurisdiction, New Jersey, which also holds
that a testator may demand that a beneficiary take the precise gift or
nothing at all. 28 Perhaps strong support for forfeitures in one context
will be balanced by forfeiture-free legal preserves where beneficiaries
are permitted to engage in their natural habits of legitimate self-interest.
The author's hope is that more courts will adopt the Colorado rule which
holds that a beneficiary having probable cause will not be subject to
forfeiture if he petitions for construction of the will, asserting its partial
invalidity, after the executor has declined to act. 12' Equally gratifying
answered the executor's bill for construction by urging that a charitable gift be declared
void. Said the court: "No action of the testator's children made the gift to the charities
invalid; the statutory law of Ohio accomplished that." Id. at 302, 98 N.E.2d at 820.
..7 Federal Trust Co. v. Ost, 120 N.J. Eq. 43, 64, 183 Atl 830, 84041, 120 N.J. Eq. 475,
186 At. 579 (1936), aff'd, 121 N.J. Eq. 608, 191 At]. 746 (1937). See also In re Storey's
Will, 134 Misc. 791, 236 N.Y. Supp. 518 (Surr. Ct. 1929), where an answering beneficiary's
violent, almost acrimonious attack was held not to work a forfeiture as the case then stood.
121 See text note 72 supra.
12' See Colorado Nat. Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 121, 353 P.2d 385 (1960). The extent
of the court's holding, however, is uncertain, since the court noted that the beneficiary's
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is the further New Jersey doctrine that, "The law will not impose upon
a fiduciary acting in the proper discharge of his duty a penalty affecting
his individual interest in the subject matter; such a rule would paralyse
official functions to the detriment of the cestuis."'' 0 Broadened from
its specific facts, this last proposition would allow an executor-bene-
ficiary, in good faith and with probable cause, to use his fiduciary role
as a quasi-officer of the court in raising questions about the validity
of a will. Should that principle be established, it would require only
a short step to the wider adoption of the rule that a good faith bene-
ficiary, acting on reasonable grounds though not as an executor, may
demand that the will be gauged by its obedience to legal standards.
In such case, a beneficiary would do nothing more than require the
proponent of a will to show that the document offered for probate was
the testator's bona fide will-which is what the law itself requires.'
At present, however, the greatest protection a dissatisfied beneficiary
has is the principle that a will is to be strictly construed and that the
testator "is bound by the mistake of his draftsman, if he intended
differently."' 32 Testamentary restrictions against "contests" have often
turned on the fact that "contest" is a word of art with a distinct and
defined meaning, as a lawsuit in which witnesses are called; a trial,
judgment, and adjudication; or legal opposition pressed home to a
decision-and that, if a testator intended a broader meaning, he should
have used other words.' 33 A contest is an attempt by legal proceedings
claim of a violation of the rule against perpetuities did not benefit him. Why should a
beneficiary's failure to profit from raising legitimate legal questions be commendable?
"'Shelley v. Creighton, 140 N.J. Eq. 603, 610, 55 A.2d 646, 651 (1947), where the
executrices and trustees were also beneficiaries against whom the forfeiture clause operated.
They sought to sell stock which the testator had prohibited them from selling, on the grounds
that they were unable to carry out his intent unless they did so. The intent they spoke of,
as might be guessed, was to benefit themselves. But cf. In re Bradenhop's Estate, 61 NJ.
Super. 526, 161 A.2d 318 (1960).
131 See Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So. 2d 881 (1946), which said of the residuary
legatee (and alleged undue influencer) that he "had as well search for rubies in the corncrib
as for equity in his behalf" because his "conduct reveals a rhythm of legal apostasy difficult
to reconcile with any rule of law." Id. at 237, 238, 28 So. 2d at 886.
'132 In re Cronin's Will, 143 Misc. 559, 564, 257 N.Y. Supp. 496, 504 (Surr. Ct. 1932),
afl'd, 237 App. Div. 856, 261 N.Y. Supp. 936 (1932).
'2' Ibid. The court here traced the historical development of the word "contest," from
the civil law, where it means the statement and answer of the plaintiff and the defendant,
thus bringing the case before a judge and usually leading to its being conducted in the
presence of witnesses; to the canon law, where a cause is said to be contestata when the
judge begins to hear the cause after an account of the claims, given not through pleadings
but by the plaintiff's statement and the defendant's answer; to the Latin etymology, which
combines the prefix "con" ("together") with the noun "testor" ("witness") or the verb
"testo" ("to testify").
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to show that the testator was incapable of making a will or that the
instrument is really the will of another because of undue influence, for
the purpose of having the will declared void and the estate administered
according to the laws of descent and distribution.'34 The word implies
a dispute between the parties plaintiff and defendant before a court
which is to decide the question put in issue, and includes an attack
on the validity of a material part of the will which, if successful, would
destroy the integrity of the plan adopted by the testator for the distribu-
tion of his estate.'" 5 In a word, said the Michigan Supreme Court,
we look upon the expression "contest or attempt to contest" as having
been employed as lawyers usually employ it and so advise their clients,
that is, as referring to a contest or attempt at contest by an actual
litigant contestant who, by notice of contest in probate court or
equitable proceeding, attempts to defeat what the testator has declared
to be his will. 136
On similar reasoning, in the context of a prohibition against a
beneficiary's taking "any action whatsoever to have the effect of invali-
dating or nullifying the provisions of this will," "action" means affirma-
tive action, and not the conduct of distant beneficiaries to permit a
default to be entered against them in a will contest."' "Dissatisfaction"
is legally expressed when a beneficiary contests or objects in a legal
proceeding to the enforcement of any provision of the will. 3 '
Faced with these limitations, the draftsman of a will may decide
to draw so broad a no-contest provision that any potentially hostile act
of a beneficiary will cause a forfeiture. 3 Yet if he does so, he may
... Clark v. Hefley, 34 Tenn. App. 389, 238 S.W.2d 513 (1950), holding that no contest
results when a beneficiary under the will sues as a third party beneficiary under a contract
between the testator and the testator's wife, by which the testator had promised to leave a
legacy to the beneficiary.
"' Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909), overruled on another point,
In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945).
... Saier v. Saier, 366 Mich. 515, 520, 115 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1962).
Van Brunt v. Osterlund, 351 Ill. App. 556, 115 N.E.2d 909 (1953).
1 In re Hickman's Estate, 308 Pa. 230, 162 Atl. 168 (1932) (dicta). But cf. Doyle v.
Paul, 119 Ind. App. 632, 86 N.E.2d 885 (1949), cited in note 42 supra.
"' See Saier v. Saier, 366 Mich. 515, 521, 115 N.W.2d 279, 282 (1962), where the court,
after the paragraph quoted in the text at note 136 supra, added: "This is not to say, of course,
that a testator might not direct forfeiture of the legacy of one who, by indirection, seeks
to harass or frustrate his will. If Mrs. Saier had assumed to advise in appropriate language
that she desired to forfeit the legacy of any beneficiary who by litigation or in any other way
might interfere with or impede the administration of her estate, or who by litigation or in
any other way might annoy or nettle unto total distraction any party concerned with her
estate, whether as beneficiary, fiduciary or counsel for fiduciary, or even the probate judge
himself, then the judiciary would be obligated to carry out such desire."
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well encounter judicial opposition because the prohibitive language is
so all-encompassing that it violates public policy. 40 His best hope of
achieving compliance with a no-contest clause is that courts will adopt
the California rule which states that "whenever an opponent uses the
appropriate machinery of the law to the thwarting of the testator's
expressed wishes, whether he succeed or fail, his action is a contest."''
(Although the same California court which announced this rule also
stated in its decision, as dicta, that "the mere filing of a paper contest,
which has been abandoned without action and has not been employed
to thwart the testator's express wishes," need not be judicially declared
a contest, 142 we are not informed of how to recognize a "paper con-
test.' 43 Clearly, a contest aimed at forcing a compromise settlement
from another beneficiary, regardless of when the contest is abandoned,
is a prohibited action.' 44)
At times a beneficiary may prompt a forfeiture even though he
has no direct part in a contest, while on other occasions his actual
participation in litigation may leave his bounty intact. If he neither
files objections to probate nor is a party to a contest, but does aid and
encourage another person's opposition, his conduct, "however deficient
in the candor of open resistance," is still culpable. To hold otherwise,
when the openly contesting beneficiary is penalized, would permit the
law "to place a premium on artifice, and to suffer the just reproach of
seeking after the shadow instead of the substance.""' In equity, the
consulting beneficiary cannot profit by his advice and encouragement
to contest the will.
46
This result may be true and proper, but it coexists with an equally
valid conclusion which, depending on our perspective, either makes it
impossible to prove a conspiracy to defeat a will or sensibly allows a
1,0 See text at notes 46.51 supra.
4In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 444, 101 Pao. 443, 446 (1909). Accord: In re
Spehar's Estate, 367 P.2d 563 (Mont. 1961), which, however, held that no contest resulted
when Yugoslav legatees brought an action to determine heirship under a state statute; In re
Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 300 P.2d 342 (1956) ; In re Howard's Estate, 68 Cal.
App. 2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945).
11' In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 444, 101 Pac. 443 (1909) (dicta).
113 In re Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 300 P.2d 342 (1956). But cf. Ayers'
Adm'r v. Ayers, 212 Ky. 400, 279 S.W. 647 (1926).
"'In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443 (1909). Accord: In re Simon's Estate,
123 N.J. Eq. 388, 196 AtL 451 (1938).
,
5 Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501. Cf. In re Matchette's Estate, 183 Misc. 228, 49 N.Y.S.
2d 561 (Surr. Ct. 1944), holding that a no-contest clause is not violated by the unsuccessful
effort to file unsigned and unverified objections to probate on behalf of a beneficiary who
disclaims responsibility for this attempted filing.
'
1 0Drennan v. Heard, 211 Fed. 335 (5th Cir. 1914).
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beneficiary obedient to the prohibition against contest to express his
honest opinion about the testamentary dispute. According to this view,
a beneficiary is safe from forfeiture if he has not initiated, conducted,
or voluntarily become a party to a contest, nor contributed to the liti-
gation expense, but is a spectator at the trial, does appear as a witness
without subpoena in the contestants' behalf, and admits sympathy with
the contestants.14 ' While it is true that the beneficiary has not actually
been subpoenaed, he could have been compelled to testify through
legal processes and therefore his testimony does not constitute volun-
tary opposition to probate."' When he is made a party defendant to
a contest, the beneficiary is under no obligation, legal or otherwise,
to deny in his answer a charge of undue influence brought against his
co-defendant, the residuary legatee, since he may be unable truthfully
to deny the charge. He may even express a desire that the contestants
succeed in their action and-if the court is willing to combine a sense
of justice with a ruthless view of testamentary language-may arrange
for the initial meeting between the contestants' attorney and a prospec-
tive witness for the opposition side, and may contribute money to the
contestants' cause."' The beneficiary also has a right to express a
feeling of hostility to, and opinion of, the executor "in any way, at
any place, at any time" he sees fit, without being vulnerable to a charge
that he directly or indirectly aided in the contest of the will. 50
14, See Haradon v. Clark, 190 Iowa 798, 180 N.W. 868 (1921) ; Saier v. Saier, 399 Mich.
515, 115 N.W.2d 279 (1962); Richards v. Piefer, 229 Mich. 609, 201 N.W. 877 (1925);
Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956). But cf. In re Largue's Estate, 198 Mo. App.
261, 200 S.W. 83 (1918), which says that to prove participation in a contest, the residuary
legatee or executor must adduce competent evidence of a substantial character tending to
show such conduct on the beneficiary's part as amounts to a direct or indirect contest (which,
analysed, says nothing). Evidence merely tending to show that the beneficiary cherished a
desire that the contestants prevail is insufficient, provided they did nothing to instigate the
proceeding, kept aloof therefrom, and did nothing to aid or further its prosecution. See also
In re Momand's Estate, 177 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Surr. Ct. 1958), stating that a bare contention
that a beneficiary failed to cooperate with the proponents of the will hardly justifies the
court in denying him his legacy.
" Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956). See also Lobb v. Brown, 208 Cal.
476, 281 Pac. 1010 (1929), where the beneficiary was subpoenaed, apparently to his perfect
satisfaction.
149 See Lobb v. Brown, 208 Cal 476, 281 Pac. 1010 (1929), which supports the position
of the childless testatrix' two nephews, whom she had raised, against the forfeiture demands
of the alleged undue influencer, a stranger to her blood whom she had met in a consultation
about her income tax returns when she was nearly eighty years old. Would it have been
more candid for the California Supreme Court to have allowed a good faith-probable cause
exception than to have reached this result by such wayward means?
"0 Lavine v. Shapiro, 257 F.2d 14, 19 (7th Cir. 1958).
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As an interested party, the beneficiary may without penalty demand
that the executor account for property claimed to be part of the estate
and may charge him with fraudulently possessing himself of the
property. All the beneficiary is doing is endeavoring to compel the
executor to give a more complete inventory of the estate. 5 ' He may
similarly bring suit to declare void certain business decisions made
by the testator-appointed directors of a company that is the major
asset of the trust estate, since this litigation is not an attempt to thwart
or overthrow the testamentary intent. 52 But a forfeiture clause will
spring into action when a beneficiary sues the executors and trustees
in ejectment, claiming an interest in specific property that has been
devised to someone else. This litigation revokes the gifts because it
is contrary to the testator's plain words against instituting proceedings
that question the validity of the will or its provisions.' In contrast,
no forfeiture will be decreed when a son, believing himself a share-
holder in a corporation run by his deceased father, brings an action
for waste and an accounting based on his alleged corporate interests,
but discontinues proceedings when he learns he has no shareholder
status. The testator's right to dispose of the stock and the brother's
right to receive it have been undisturbed by this dismissed litigation.
In good faith, the beneficiary "was merely proceeding upon the mis-




The status of a creditor's claim depends on the testator's intent, as
measured by an equitable doctrine of long standing. When a testator
gives a beneficiary a legacy in lieu and satisfaction of one particular
thing, the gift will not be construed as being in lieu of everything else,
and the beneficiary may seek another benefit (such as a claim for
payment for services) even though it is contrary to the will.155 It is
21 In re Seipel's Estate, 130 Cal. App. 273, 19 P.2d 808 (1933).
152 In re Lummis' Estate, 126 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. N.J. 1954).
52a Fuller v. Fuller, 217 Ga. 316, 122 S.E.2d 234 (1961).
154 In re Smyth's Will, 246 App. Div. 820, 284 N.Y. Supp. 470 (1936), afl'd, 271 N.Y.
623, 3 N.E.2d 453 (1936). See also Liggett v. Liggett, 341 Mo. 213, 108 S.W.2d 129 (1937),
where the testatrix' son, during her lifetime and before she made a will, filed suit against
her, claiming an interest in certain lands subject to the testatrix' life estate. At the time
her will was drawn by an experienced attorney, she knew of this suit but made no testa-
mentary provision about it. Therefore, a forfeiture clause prohibiting a beneficiary from
using legal means to break her will is not violated by the son's earlier litigation. We should
note, however, that the land demanded in the lawsuit and given in the will was the same,
but that the son claimed as of right rather than as a beneficiary.
155 Hapgood v. Houghton, 22 Pick. 480 (Mass. 1839). See text at notes 18-22 supra.
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correct that a beneficiary cannot accept the benefit intended for him
under a will and at the same time reject the will by asserting his own
inconsistent proprietary rights. But to render acceptance of a testa-
mentary provision as being in lieu of the proprietary right, the will
must declare that this is so, or the intention must be deduced from
clear and manifest implication in the will, founded on the fact that
the proprietary claim is inconsistent with the will or so repugnant to
its conditions as to disturb and defeat them.'5"
An action to enforce the terms of an oral contract to devise property,
for example, is based on a creditor's claim and is not a contest. Although
allowance or enforcement of the claim would change the amount
received by the residuary legatees, as would the enforcement of any
other creditor's claim, it would not break the terms and conditions
of the will and would not establish the claimant as residuary legatee."'r
No presumption arises that a legacy is given in satisfaction of a debt
where the will does not contain such a provision, the indebtedness is
unliquidated, and the will contains a direction to the executors to pay
the testator's "just debts."' 58 Even when there is no such direction
the estate is liable for the payment of all just debts." 9
The propriety of these decisions would be beyond dispute were it
not for the singular presence of a California Supreme Court decision...
which affirmed a forfeiture after a niece-beneficiary had unsuccessfully
prosecuted a 25,000 dollar claim based on an alleged express oral
contract for personal services provided to the testatrix. Under a broad
no-contest clause that contained provisions against suing or disturbing
the executor, the court held that the testatrix "intended to penalize the
commencement of any suit whatever."'' That being so, the beneficiary
' Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 (1865).
1 Boettcher v. Busse, 45 Wash. 2d 579, 277 P.2d 368 (1954). See also Estate of Miller,
212 A.C.A. 279, Cal. Rptr. 909 (1963): an attempt to enforce a testamentary contract in
equity by imposing a constructive trust does not interfere with probate proceedings or with
the executor's administration of the estate. (Dictum.)
""In re Marshall's Estate, 119 Misc. 407, 196 N.Y. Supp. 330 (Surr. Ct. 1922). See
also Sherwood v. McLaurin, 103 S.C. 370, 88 S.E. 363 (1916), stating that no forfeiture
occurs when there is no gift over eo nomine, despite the legacy's having been intended to
take care of the claim; the beneficiary, however, could not take both. See also In re Cronin's
Will, 143 Misc. 559, 257 N.Y. Supp. 496 (Surr. Ct. 1932), afl'd, 237 App. Div. 856, 261
N.Y. Supp. 936 (1932).
"I' Wright v. Cummins, 108 Kan. 667, 196 Pac. 246 (1921) (dicta), where good faith
and probable cause were presumed in a daughter's having filed a claim against her father's
estate.
"' In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 220 Pac. 301 (1923).
... Id. at 389, 220 Pac. at 303.
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must choose between accepting what the will gives her or taking the
-chance of making good her claim on the estate, even if the claim is
a "just debt." Why? Although the testatrix may have directed that
her just debts be paid, it by no means follows that she intended a debt
collection suit brought by a beneficiary would not be a forfeiture. The
"just debt" provisions, hypothesized the court, were "probably inserted
with no idea of the stress which would be attempted to be placed upon
them."' 62 We may ask, with legitimate indignation, how the court
divined the testatrix' ignorance about the effect of her "just debt"
provisions and, by implication, recognized her wide foresight in pro-
viding a no-contest clause to penalize the lawful presentation of those
claims. Surely a forfeiture clause is as much a matter of form as a
provision for just debts. Must the court assign greater force to the
penalty than to a theory that reconciles payment of just debts with
prohibitions against vexatious litigation? Fortunately, a later (but
inferior) California court has held that under the no-contest clause
it was considering, the beneficiary's filing of a subsequently-disallowed
claim against the estate is not equivalent to contesting the decedent's
will, failing to abide by its terms, or interfering with its admin-
istration. 6 '
When other rights, such as statutory marital benefits, are presumed
to exist, a surviving spouse may sometimes unsuccessfully try to assert
those rights instead of his rights under the will. As a sound rule for
these instances, the right of election should command two or more
actual and inconsistent rights from which the spouse has power to
choose, and his misconceived attempt to take a non-existent statutory
benefit should not prevent him from taking under the will.' The
112 Id. at 391, 220 Pac. at 303.
0' In re Madansky's Estate, 29 Cal. App. 2d 685, 85 P.2d 576 (1939). Cf. Fifield v. Van
Wyck's Executor, 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897), stating that when no condition is annexed
to the legacies to make an election operative, the legatees are not required to elect between
taking under the will and attacking the validity of the residuary clause. "The testatrix did
not attempt to dispose of any property right of the appellants. There was nothing, therefore,
for them to elect to give up in lieu of what she bequeathed them." Id. at 562, 27 S.E. at 448.
See also Smith v. Negley, 304 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), stating that unless the will
attempts to force a person to forego some right as an heir in order to qualify as a beneficiary,
the court will not undertake to do so. And see In re Dow's Estate, 149 Cal. App. 2d 47, 308
P.2d 475 (1957), which cites Madansky's Estate, supra, and distinguishes Kitchen, supra
note 160, in ruling that the assertion of a creditor's claim, even if unsuccessful, does not
violate the no-contest clause, on the principle that a forfeiture clause must be strictly
construed.
164 See In re Rettenmeyer's Estate, 345 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1959). See also In re Tourneau's
Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 941, 156 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Surr. Ct. 1950), holding that the filing of a subse-
quently abandoned widow's election to take against the will does not work a forfeiture.
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"mudsill" of this principle, according to a Georgia court," 5 is that
the testator must bestow a benefit on another, who in turn must accept
the benefit. Until this acceptance, the beneficiary need not adopt the
entire contents of the will, conform to all its provisions, or renounce
any inconsistent rights. A case of election arises only when the bene-
ficiary has the legal right to different benefits, the complete enforcement
of which would be inequitable to others having claims on the same
property or fund. If, therefore, an executor and the legatees can
defeat a widow in her efforts to get dower, it would be unconscionable
for them later to defeat her right to the legacy given by her husband's
will.
For certain statutory benefits, even a beneficiary who successfully
asserts his extra-testamentary rights does not expose himself to for-
feiture. An executor who is also a legatee may properly renounce the
specific compensation awarded him in the will for his fiduciary services
and may obtain statutory compensation instead; in trying to deprive
him of his statutory right, the forfeiture clause is contrary to public
policy. 66 Similarly, a widow may petition for her family allowance
(amounting here to 38,500 dollars) as a statutory right without violat-
ing the no-contest clause, although the court hints that a testator may
specifically forbid this solicitation.' 7
On the other side of the precedent scale, however, a widow's effec-
tive election to take against the will sufficiently activates a forfeiture
directed against her son, whose benefits are lawfully cut down by the
twice-married testator's alternative provisions for an equitable distri-
bution between his two sets of children. 6 A son's claim that land
devised by his father was actually his mother's separate property
..5 Harber v. Harber, 158 Ga. 274, 123 S.E. 114 (1924).
... In re Folsom's Will, 142 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
""' In re Dow's Estate, 149 Cal. App. 2d 47, 308 P.2d 475 (1957). See also In re Byrnes'
Estate, 141 Misc. 346, 252 N.Y. Supp. 587 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 235 App. Div. 782, 257
N.Y. Supp. 884, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56 (1932), holding that a forfeiture clause is futile
to prevent a wife's statutory election because she cannot be denied her statutory rights by a
testamentary provision forbidding her to contest the terms of the will. Further (in an encour-
agement of possible over-reaching that may have resulted from this being a "novel" case),
since the statute provides that the will remain in effect as far as possible, an accounting
procedure is necessary to determine what the election has done to the will. (The possible
over-reaching would occur, however, only if she were allowed to take both under and outside
the will.) For apparently antagonistic results arising from legal action taken under Cali-
fornia Probate Code section 41, limiting charitable gifts, see Estate of Scott, 217 A.C.A. 137
(1963) (the action was not a contest) distinguishing itself from Estate of Holtermann, 206
Cal. App. 2d 460, 23 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1962) (the action was a contest).
1" In re Alexander's Estate, 341 Pa. 471, 19 A.2d 374 (1941).
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amounts to a contest of the father's will, regardless of the fact that
the testator had no right to will that property. The son has elected to
take as an heir of his mother and can recover only in that capacity.'69
The widow of a testator's subsequently-deceased beneficiary also works
a forfeiture by trying to have the devised land set apart for a statutory
year's support in defiance of a testamentary provision that none of
the land should pass to her by agreement or legal action. The original
devise was on a condition subsequent that is not contrary to public
policy.1
70
As to community property disputes between a surviving spouse
and the deceased spouse's estate, the rule seems to be that an action
which can enrich the estate is to be commended, while one to benefit
the survivor leads to forfeiture. California has blurred the distinctions
between these situations except for the incompatible results it permits.
So, where a wife claims that certain inter vivos gifts were and are
community property to which she is entitled to a one-half interest, she
is alleging something in the nature of a declaratory action to determine
whether the estate is community or separate and is attempting to bring
back into the estate the inter vivos gifts a third person has been claiming
as his own. This proceeding clearly benefits the estate by increasing its
assets and reducing the number of claimants against it.'' But where
a no-contest clause penalizes anyone who questions the validity of the
will provisions, a surviving husband, regardless of his good faith, does
suffer a forfeiture for claiming a one-half interest in property which
the testatrix has referred to as her "separate property" and as "my
stock.' 17' The recurrence of decisions like these make it difficult for
an observer to put his faith in any judicial principle save: "Let justice
be done, and let reasoning fall."
Legal actions in other areas which properly do lie outside the scope
of a no-contest clause include the good faith proposing for probate
of a purported later and inconsistent will. An individual has a duty
to file the alleged will, and has a right to petition for its probate.'73
The primary object of this attempt is to establish what is believed to
be, in good faith, the final expression of the decedent's testamentary
1.9 Massie v. Massie, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 118 S.W. 219 (1909).
..0 Blevins v. Pittman, 189 Ga. 789, 7 S.E.2d 662 (1940).
... See In re Dow's Estate, 149 Cal. App. 2d 47, 308 P.2d 475 (1957).
... See In re Howard's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945).
"' See In re Bergland's Estate, 177 Cal. 227, 170 Pac. 400 (1918), 180 Cal. 629, 182
Pac. 277 (1919).
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wishes. 7 One who in bad faith presents a spurious instrument, with
intent to overthrow a prior genuine will, is fittingly subject to for-
feiture.' 5 Bad faith can be shown by evidence that the testatrix'
husband took possession of her latest will on the date of its execution
and, without her consent, fraudulently concealed or destroyed it, then
after her death petitioned for probate of an earlier will more favorable
to him.1 '
Other miscellaneous legal activity and its consequences may
properly be itemized here with more deference to information than
to conceptual integration:
A beneficiary has the right to ask for probate proceedings to be
dismissed in one state on the ground that the decedent was a resident
of another state, even when the proponents of the will allege that the
beneficiary's purpose is to bring a contest in the second state without
risking a forfeiture there.'
The mere filing of a general appearance, without more, is not an
act of opposition to probate of the will, since there may be adequate
reasons for appearing without any intent to oppose probate, such as a
desire to be heard on the named executor's suitability for appointment,
on the amount of his bond, and on the alleged residence of the
deceased. 1 '
The action of beneficiaries under an inter vivos trust, joining with
the trustor's court-appointed guardian to set aside the trust because of
the trustor's alleged (but unproven) incompetency, does not violate
""'In re Bergland's Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 Pac. 277 (1919); In re Kirkholder's
Estate, 171 App. Div. 153, 157 N.Y. Supp. 37 (1916).
SIbid.
In re Mathie's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 2d 767, 149 P.2d 485 (1944). The husband's bad
faith was further shown by his petition for a homestead of property claimed to be commu.
nity but actually his wife's separate property. Despite all this, the husband became entitled
to an intestate share of his forfeited gifts because the no-contest clause did not provide for
a disposition of that property.
", See In re Crisler's Estate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 198, 217 P.2d 470 (1950). See also In re
Hill's Estate, 176 Cal. 619, 169 Pac. 371 (1917), holding that no contest occurs when the
decedent's daughter files a petition for letters of administration in another state, expressing
a belief that her father died intestate, but advising the court that certain papers in existence
were alleged to be the decedent's will. See also Maguire v. Bliss, 304 Mass. 12, 22 N.E.2d
615 (1939), stating that any party in interest can insist that the petition for probate be
dismissed on the jurisdictional ground of non-residency, since this is in aid of the lawful
and orderly probate of the will rather than in opposition to it.
... See Maguire v. Bliss, 304 Mass. 12, 22 N.E.2d 615 (1939).
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the instrument's no-contest clause. The beneficiaries are considered
as the trustor's own representatives in the attack on himself." 9
Even though a beneficiary has filed a contest which is ultimately
dismissed, she may keep her legacy as a voluntary payment by the
principal beneficiary and would-be recipient of the forfeited gift, if
the principal beneficiary, with knowledge of the facts, first pays and
then, by a ruse, regains the amount of the legacy."'
If a testator makes a will, the authenticity of which is never dis-
puted, his son may properly answer the petition for probate by ques-
tioning the legal efficacy of changes and modifications which the testator
had allegedly made at some time after execution of the basic document.
By so answering, the son imposes no burden other than or different
from the one imposed by the state as a condition precedent to admitting
the will to probate, namely that the proponent must prove the elements
constituting the alleged execution.'
Disobedience to testamentary instructions has also been counte-
nanced, without forfeiture, when the means.employed were non-judicial,
as the circumvention of a trust provision by the remainderman bene-
ficiaries conveying quitclaim deeds to the life tenant beneficiary, who
then sells the property to strangers before the stated trust period has
expired. This result is justified because the language of the no-contest
clause contemplates court action that attacks the validity of the will
or attempts to vacate, alter, or change any of its provisions. To work
a forfeiture, a judicial contest or determination was necessary.'
179 See Cox v. Fisher, 322 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1959). Said the court: "Consequently, in a
way, it could be said that by joining as parties plaintiff in the contest action appellants were
attempting to thwart or frustrate trustor's intention as of the time he executed the trust
instruments; nevertheless they were joining in and furthering trustor's purpose at the time
he by guardian was asserting in the contest his own incompetency as of the time he executed
the trust instruments." Id. at 915-16. C. Gilbert, The Mikado, Act I:
Ko-Ko: Now as my Solicitor, how do you advise me to deal with this difficulty?
Pooh-Bah: Oh, as your Solicitor, I should have no hesitation in saying "Chance it -"
Ko-Ko: Thank you. (Shaking his hand.) I will.
Pooh-Bah: If it were not that, as Lord Chief Justice, I am bound to see that the law
isn't violated.
... See Winter v. Turner, 169 Ohio St. 233, 158 N.E.2d 897 (1959). This was the ruse
at issue: after the contesting beneficiary had received her legacy by certified check, the prin-
cipal beneficiary's son-in-law, an attorney, asked to see it. As soon as he got physical posses-
sion, he carried it away over the beneficiary's protests.
1"" See Scriven v. Scriven, 153 Neb. 655, 45 N.W.2d 760 (1951).
... See Clark v. Bentley, 398 Ill. 535, 76 N.E.2d 438 (1947). See also Whitmore v.
Smith, 94 Okla. 90, 221 Pac. 775 (1923), where the rights of a non-conveying beneficiary
were in no way disturbed. See also Marx v. Rice, I N.J. 574, 65 A.2d 48 (1949), where the
remainderman's application for accelerated benefits was considered a means of interpreting
the will under new conditions that had unexpectedly arisen.
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From this catalogue of hostile or excusable acts, we have un-
doubtedly failed in trying to ferret out a significant, universal determi-
nation of what acts create a contest (although the author believes the
"double effect" test is useful). As failures, we may sympathize with
the lament of a New York court which said:
Out of this confusion of authority there can come only a balanced
negation; an equality of sounds which produce silence. There is
precedent for every inconsistent solution of the question, but prescript
for none. 183
How Minors Are Affected by the No-Contest Clause
The effect on minors of a no-contest clause is, as might be expected,
yet another area where variant decisions afflict the law. According to
one doctrine, even though a minor appears through a guardian ad litem,
the guardian's action is conclusive upon the child and works a for-
feiture of his interest in the will.' The infant's consent is not neces-
sary for the suit to be maintained, but the law still recognizes no
distinction between a decree against an infant and one against an
adult. The only grounds on which an infant can impeach the decree
are those which would invalidate it for an adult. If the testator had
wanted to exempt his infant beneficiaries from the operation of the
no-contest clause, he could have used appropriate language to that
end."8 5 Otherwise, "a person without infant dependents could exercise
a control over the disposition of his property that another with such
dependents could not."'8 6
Because of this propriety of forfeiture, says a Kentucky court 8 7
which really evades the issue, a court which has the duty to protect an
infant's substantial rights must see that a next friend does nothing to
prejudice or injure these rights. Granted that the next friend, alleging
lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, may seek to press
the contest action in good faith, at the request of a close blood relative
of the infant, and on evidence that would make out a prima facie case
"'In re Wall, 76 Misc. 106, 136 N.Y. Supp. 452 (Surr. Ct. 1912), which eventually
decided that the forfeiture clause is without effect because there is no gift over.
18, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wolfman, 311 Mass. 614, 42 N.E.2d 574 (1942).
""Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 95 S.E.2d 213 (1956).
2" Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Ky. 30, 203 S.W. 856, 861 (1918), opinion
extended, 181 Ky. 566, 205 S.W. 564 (1918). The court here uses the right considerations-
family responsibility-to reach the wrong result.
11" Moorman v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Ky. 30, 43, 203 S.W. 856 (1918), opinion
extended, 181 Ky. 566, 205 S.W. 564 (1918).
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-nevertheless the court properly refuses to let him proceed. The next
friend does not go far enough to protect the interests of the child, for
the proposed evidence will be sifted by cross-examination and be met
by conflicting and countervailing evidence in a trial that permits the
widest latitude. Since the harm to the infant would be so disastrous if
she loses, she herself should be allowed to decide when she reaches her
majority. This delay will afford her no risk other than that her witnesses
may die or have their memory of essential facts dimmed-an odd
proposition on which to base a rule of law, especially after the court
has just finished detailing her prospects of failure. We should also
record that the minor here was only two-and-one-half years short of
attaining her majority. Would the happenstance of a fifteen or twenty
year wait have changed the law? If so, and she were allowed to proceed
by a next friend, would the court have penalized her for an unsuccessful
contest?
The philosophy of other courts does free a minor from the for-
feiture penalty, even where a no-contest clause is enforceable against
an adult beneficiary whose good faith and probable cause are of no
account. The penalty will not apply to a minor with a guardian who,
acting under the direction of a probate court, unsuccessfully contests
a will. It is logical, just, and essential to the probate court's function
to protect minors' interests in this way.' s When a no-contest clause
conflicts with a court's statutory duty to look after the rights of infants,
the testamentary provision is illegal and void as being against public
policy."8 9 As well-described in an early New York decision,"O a
court-appointed guardian in a probate action is selected for his compe-
tency, experience, and judgment. Being responsible to the law for the
performance of the obligations it imposes on him, he has no choice once
he believes the testator lacked testamentary capacity. The guardian,
in that instance, must contest the will with action that is, his, rather
than his ward's. She is bound by the final decree in that dispute, but
only because of the legal effect of her guardian's action.
By his own mandate the guardian was required to act. If he failed to
do so he was in danger of becoming liable to his ward because of such
failure, and had to choose between two alternatives, and for choosing
as he did, the ward having no choice herself but being legally
incapable of choice by reason of her infancy, and having no control
's See Farr v. Whitefield, 322 Mich. 275, 33 N.W.2d 791 (1948).
's' See In re Andrus' Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N.Y. Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
210 Bryant v. Tracy, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 183 (N.Y. 1890).
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over that made by him, cannot consistently be held responsible in the
loss of her estate for the election he made to contest the will.19 1
What makes these judicial conflicts unique as they affect minors
is the possibility of a minor's right to support after a parent's death,
regardless of the parent's testamentary scheme and, therefore, regard-
less of a forfeiture decree. At least in California-the only jurisdiction
in which the author has researched this idea-there exists the nucleus
of a philosophy that would give a child enforceable claims necessarily
blunting a no-contest clause directed against his interests. Strangely
enough, as the law now stands, the children of divorced parents are in
a better position to assert this right than are the children from a home
unified until one parent died.
Referring to forfeiture clauses in general (and therefore mis-
leadingly), a California court has said:
The property of a testatrix is hers to dispose of as she wills, and she
is not called on to consult or follow the wishes or views of her heirs
or beneficiaries or of courts or juries. . . . The testatrix was free to
dispose of her property on whatever condition she wished to impose
so long as the condition was not prohibited by law or opposed to
public policy. She could give or refrain from giving, and could attach
to her gifts any lawful condition which her reason or caprice might
dictate. She was disposing of her property and the beneficiary claim-
ing thereunder must take the gift, if at all, on the terms offered. 192
This strong concept has as its tender underbelly the modification,
often stated and often ignored, that the testatrix is unfettered "so long
as the condition was not prohibited by law or opposed to public policy."
It has been said, as dicta, that the objectionable conditions are those
restraining marriage or lawful trade. 9 ' More to the point, however,
the California Supreme Court has established that a father's obligation
to support his minor child, when fixed by a property settlement and
confirmed by a divorce decree, survives his death and becomes a charge
against his estate for all sums accruing during the child's minority."'
... Id. at 191-92. See also Perry v. Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 114 S.W. 897 (1908),'
which states that a forfeiture does operate against a minor when the forbidden act is per-
formed by others, but which indicates there might be force in the contention against this
result if the forfeiture bad depended on some act or failure to act attributable to the minor
himself. But cf. In re White's Estate, 163 Pa. 388, 30 Atl. 192 (1894), refusing to decree a
forfeiture because of the testator's attempt to ingraft on the minor's legacy a condition
subsequent through which his estate could be lost by the acts of persons over whom he had
no control and for whose conduct he was in no way responsible.
2 2 In re Fuller's Estate, 143 Cal. App. 2d 820, 823, 300 P.2d 342, 344 (1956).
' Estate of Miller, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842 (1909).
... Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P.2d 511 (1932).
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An action can be brought to establish this as a valid and subsisting
claim against the father's estate, and rightfully so,
for it is the solemn duty of every father to support his children during
their minority, and if he fails to do so, every principle of justice
demands that they be thus supported out of his estate.' 95
Asserting that the necessity for a minor's support is the same
whether the father is alive or dead, the court has also asked-". . is
there any reason why this support should cease on the death of the
father, leaving property properly applicable for the payment of said
support?"-and has answered negatively-"Surely no obligation can
exceed in importance that which the father owes to his own off-
spring."'9 6 As direct proof of the relationship between a parent's last
will and his duty to provide child support, the court has denied a claim
for this support brought against the father's estate when the father had
recognized his obligation and made testamentary provisions that operate
as a complete satisfaction of the duty owed the child.'
These cases, it is true, deal with the children of divorced
parents, but:
[D]iscrimination against the children for whose benefit the court
has not been called on during the father's lifetime to issue a support
order i.e., most children in undivided homes and illegitimates whose
support has been enforced by penal proceedings instead of by a civil
order) would be hard to justify legally. . . . In sum as the child
(legitimate or illegitimate) is entitled to support during minority
from his father, the father no longer can ignore this obligation and
will all his property to others. 198
Given such rights-or such reasonable grounds for believing in
"" Id. at 612-13, 15 P.2d at 513, which also states that the divorce decree need not
impose a lien on the father's property to secure payment of the sums that come due in the
continuing obligation.
... Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 654, 659, 254 Pac. 567, 569 (1927), where there also had
been a divorce.
"" Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 2d 552, 212 P.2d 505 (1949), where there had also been a
divorce. See also Estate of Caldwell, 129 Cal. App. 613, 19 P.2d 9 (1933), dealing with a
contractual agreement between husband and wife to support a minor child; and Schumm v.
Berg, 37 Cal. 2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951), dealing with an agreement about an illegitimate
child.
1" 2 ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 1129 (1953). The present author suggests
that if and when a case does arise over the claims of a minor child from an undivided home,
his likelihood of succeeding against his parent's estate will be enhanced if there is simul-
taneously brought a similar proceeding by a child from an earlier marriage of the decedent.
Should the child of the "happy home" fail, anxious mothers may be tempted to sue for
divorce chiefly to protect their children's economic position (or would at least consider this
chance for gain as a factor in the attempt to work out a solution for marriage problems).
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their necessity and existence-must a minor be penalized for demand-
ing a full measure of his parent's bounty? Given such precedent and
social value, may a court justify a forfeiture by consecrating the
testator's right to dispose of his estate through any "reason or caprice"
he chooses?
Conclusion
The value of laws cannot be determined by their internal consistency
or chaos, for legal symmetry is admirable only when its subject matter
is equally symmetrical. Remembering the disrupted lives, economic
disorder, and bruised expectations that follow a death in the family,
we should reasonably expect the law of dissatisfaction and forfeiture
to be a discordant reflection of the people it must serve. Perhaps the
only questions we should ask about past decisions in this field are:
What, if anything, would have been a truly logical result? What
deserving parties, if any, would have been harmed by that conclusion?
For future cases, we must simply urge our irreconcilable positions and
know that specific justice is often fathered by the accidental technicali-
ties adhering to general principles. Although we can do no better
now, we should realize that the real party in interest-the testator-is
not amenable to earthly jurisdiction. We might reserve our final pleas
until all parties are before the same court.
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